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Doctrinal Development

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THE WESTERN CHURCH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGES
CHAPTER I.	
<i>The Theological Foundation as seen in Augustine</i>	1-16
I. Historical Presuppositions (p. 1). II. Augustine's General Relation to the Later History of the Church (p. 1). III. Outline of his Life and most Important Writings (p. 2). IV. Stages in his Religious Experience - His Religious Ideal (pp. 3-3). V. His Theological Conceptions (pp. 3-8). VI. On the Relation of Sin and Grace to the Freedom of the Will (pp. 8-10). VII. The Relation of his Doctrine of Grace to his Common Catholic Views and to his Neo-Platonic Conceptions (pp. 10-13). VIII. His Conception of the Church and the Sacraments (pp. 12-14). IX. Against the Donatists, (pp. 14-15). X. The Earthly State and the Divine State (pp. 15-16).	
CHAPTER II.	
<i>Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism</i>	16-26
I. Historical Sketch of Pelagianism (pp. 16-17). II. The Original Pelagian Ideas of Freedom, Sin and Grace (pp. 17-18). III. Julian's Positive Development of Pelagianism (pp. 18-20). IV. Semi-Pelagianism (pp. 21-26).	
CHAPTER III.	
<i>Roman Catholicism in the Early Middle Ages (600-1050 A. D.)</i>	27-34
I. General Situation (p. 27). II. General Attitude toward Augustinian Tradition (pp. 27-28). III. The Development of the Mass (pp. 28-30). IV. The Sacraments of Penance and of Indulgence (pp. 30-32). V. Completion of the Doctrine of Transubstantiation (pp. 32-34).	
CHAPTER IV.	
<i>Theological Science and the New Piety,—to about 1300 A. D.</i>	34-48
I. General Survey (pp. 34-35). II. Anselm (pp. 35-37). III. Abelard (pp. 37-38). IV. The New Piety and Mysticism (pp. 38-41). V. The Perfected Scientific Theology (pp. 41-48).	
CHAPTER V.	
<i>The Development of a Crisis in the Roman Catholicism of the Middle Ages (1300-1500 A. D.)</i>	48-56
I. General Survey (pp. 48-49). II. The Going out of Scholasticism (p. 49). III. The coming in of Nominalism (pp. 49-51). IV. Mysticism and Mystic Piety (pp. 51-53). V. The So Called Pre-Reformers (pp. 53-55). VI. The Renaissance and Humanism (pp. 55-56).	
CHAPTER VI.	
<i>The Religious Understanding of the Gospel in Protestantism and the Partial Reconstruction of Catholic Doctrine</i>	57-87
I. The Religious Understanding of the Gospel and the Dogmatic Tradition of Martin Luther (pp. 57-67). II. The Evangelical Christianity of Zwingli (pp. 67-70). III. The Doctrinal Conception of Evangelical Christianity by Calvin (pp. 70-87).	
CHAPTER VII.	
<i>Doctrinal Development as seen in the Symbols of the Evangelical Protestant Churches</i>	87

OUTLINE

... OF THE ...

Doctrinal Development in the Western Church.

Based on the Dogmengeschichte of Friedrich Loofs.

CHAPTER I.

THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AS SEEN IN AUGUSTINE.

I. Historical Preconceptions.

The student of Augustine will need to recall definitely the theology already to be found in the Church. Back of him were the developed conceptions of Irenaeus and Tertullian; of Hippolytus and Novatian; of Origen and Cyprian; of Basil and the two Gregories; of Athanasius and Ambrose. And back of him stood the credal decision of the Council of Nicea, and the condemnation of Arian views; together with the Council of Constantinople in 381 A. D., which not only reaffirmed the former definition, but formally condemned the christological errors of the semi-Arians, the Sabellians, and the holders of the view of Apollinarius.

II. Augustine's General Relation to the Later History of the Church.

Because of a many-sided influence which came from him, he became the father of Western Christianity. By his emphasis of sin and of the morally-renewing grace of God, he lifted Western Christianity above the Greek; the Neo-Platonic background of his religious conceptions influenced Catholic mysticism; his doctrine of the Trinity became dominant in the West; his exalted conception of the Church, and his ideas of the *civitas dei* did much to shape the common Catholic views of the relation which the Church should bear to the individual and to the state. At the same time it became true, on the other hand, that Augustine's religious ideas furnished nourishment to the growing opposition within the Church at the close of the Middle Ages; while his predestination views—which were contradictory to the popular Catholic ideas,—became a lever to the anti-hierarchical opposition which arose in the Reformation period.

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III. Outline of His Life and Most Important Writings.

1). *His Youth and School Life*:—He was born at Tagasta in 352 A. D., and studied in Carthage from the sixteenth to the nineteenth year of his life. 2). *His Activities*:—He taught rhetoric in Tagasta, in Carthage and in Rome, and finally in Milan, where in 386 he was converted under the influence of his mother, Monica, and the teaching of Ambrose. He was baptized on Easter eve., in 387. His mother died on the return journey to Africa. On reaching Tagasta, Augustine disposed of his property and began a humble life of self-abasement. But in 391 he was laid hold of for the priesthood; and in 395 he was made a bishop. He died at Hippo in 430 A. D. 3). *His Most Important Writings*:—(1). *Anti-Heretical Works*,—against the Manichaeans: against the Donatists: against the Pelagians and the semi-Pelagians. (2). *Expository Works*,—Exposition of the Psalms: A Harmony of the Gospels: The Sermon on the Mount: Homilies on the New Testament Lessons; on the Gospel and Epistles of John. (3). *Constructive Theological Works*,—The Enchiridion: on the Trinity, and other Doctrinal Treatises. (4). Confessions: City of God: Letters.

IV. Stages in His Religious Experience—His Religious Ideal

1). In 373 the Hortensius of Cicero awakened him to a love of truth. This was followed by his long and serious search for spiritual satisfaction in Manichaeism; and in Neo-Platonism. Then came his willing acceptance of the Christian and churchly truth, and hatred of his sins. He was brought to this by the majesty of the historical Jesus, and by the overpowering ideal of Monasticism. 2). Augustine has not given us systematic theology, but there is a fundamental connection of principles in which it is his thought of God which rules. With him the triune God is not only the eternal Truth, but is the Spring of all truth. In speaking on *Ps.* 134:6 he says,—“He is the *summum bonum*, the Good from which are all goods; He is the good without which nothing is good; and the Good which is Good without anything else.” And since nothing else is verity in comparison with God, so man can come to have a share in true being, in good being, only through union with God. On *Ps.* 72:34 he says, in this strain, “For me to cleave to God is good. This is the whole good. Do you wish more? . . . Nothing is better than to cleave unto God.” We may say, then, that to Augustine God is the only *res* which dare be enjoyed, our highest and only end. The *fruitio dei* is life, the eternal life. 3). There seems to be in these thoughts a praising of that ecstatic mysticism

which would lay hold of the soul and carry it up to God. Used in the narrowest sense they are mystical, but he does not attempt to systematize them. The imitation of Jesus, as it appears in the light of *Matt.* 19:21, is a life going out beyond the unconditioned duty of mere precepts, and making possible a more excellent degree of sanctity. Although the fulfilling of the love to God is not regularly thought of ecstatically, yet it had in it the genuinely mystic color of "the contemplation of the beauty of God" after the manner of the Egyptian ascetics.

V. His Theological Conceptions.

1. *As to God.* There are philosophical as well as religious elements in his theological conceptions, but the religious in Augustine certainly dominated the philosophical. His fundamental ideas are unquestionably in advance of the Greek ideas. This appears clearly in his central point, the conception of God. Here it is psychological and not cosmological considerations which bind everything into a whole,—“Thou hast made us for Thyself and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee.” That it is essential to the nature of God to impart Himself, corresponds to the religious need of man,—“Since God knew that it would be to our profit to love Him, He made Himself lovable.” And man is blessed and morally good only “*in cleaving unto God.*” It was in connection with such ideas as these that Augustine’s piety arose to a *religious* grasp of the conception of God,—“God is He to whom alone we ought to cling for His own sake.” Here is religious faith in a personal God. But Augustine also indulges in metaphysical conceptions independent of historical revelation. God is the highest absolute indivisible Being [*essentia*], in contrast with the world which exists only conditionally in its manifoldness and changeableness. We shall see that all attempts to unite the doctrine of God closely and finally with faith in the historical Christ failed also with Augustine.

2. *As to the Trinity.* Dorner says of Augustine, that he brought clearness into the conception of the Trinity, because with him “each person had an equally important part.” He conceives of the Triune God as personality,—“We do not say three persons from one essence, as if there were one thing which is essence and another thing as person,” (8, 6, 11). He does not, however, think the term *person* is perfectly satisfactory,—“In truth, as the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Spirit; and the Holy Spirit, called the ‘Gift of God,’ is neither the Father nor the Son, certainly they are three. But if the question be asked, ‘Three

what?' human language labors under great poverty. The answer, however, is 'Three persons,'—not that it should be said, but that it should not be left unsaid," (5, 9, 10).

The persons, from our point of view, are distinguished by the relations which they bear one to another,—“The Father begets, the Son is begotten of the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son [as *unum principium* with reference to the Spirit].” “If it is questioned concerning them severally, each one of them may be called God and Omnipotent, while in truth, concerning them altogether, there are not three Gods, or three Omnipotent beings, but one Omnipotent God,” (*Civ. Dei* 11:24). “Always and inseparably is the Father with the Son and the Son with the Father—neither alone,” (*Trin.* 6, 7, 9). “Since therefore the Father alone or the Son alone or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together, in no way is He to be called threefold,” (6, 8, 9). He did not therefore hold to a mere economic view of the Trinity, but to an immanent Trinity.

The student in this connection should read Augustine's *Letter* No. 169, from which the following extract is taken: “Therefore let us with steadfast piety believe in one God, the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; let us at the same time believe that the Son is not [he] who is the Father, and the Father is not he who is the Son, and neither the Father nor the Son is he who is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. Let it not be supposed that in this trinity there is any separation in respect of time or place, but that these Three are equal and co-eternal, and absolutely of one nature; and that the creatures have been made not some by the Father, and some by the Son, and some by the Holy Spirit, but that each and all that have been or are now being created subsist in the Trinity as their Creator; and that no one is saved by the Father without the Son and the Holy Spirit, or by the Son without the Father and the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit without the Father and the Son,—but by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the only one, true, and truly immortal (that is absolutely unchangeable) God. . . . To present this in a form which the intellect may apprehend we borrow an illustration from the Memory, the Understanding and the Will. For although we can speak of each of these faculties severally in its own order, and at a separate time, we neither exercise nor even mention one of these without the other two.” The memory, understanding and will, it will be noted, are not three modes of existence, but a triune existence in

which there is perfect equality and complete consciousness.

3. *His Doctrine of Sin.* 1). *The Nature of Original Liberty:*—God made man righteous and consequently with a good will, with a free will turned toward the good. God also gave him that “assistance” [*adjutorium*] without which man would not have been able to remain in this good will if he wished. But God left it to man’s free choice that he *should will freely*. This first man, by means of this assisting grace, in the power of an undivided love directed upon God, was able not to sin, not to desert the good, not to die;—“The first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin, the first immortality to be able not to die, the first perseverance not to desert the good,” (*On Rebuke*, 33). By perseverance man would have received that plenitude of blessedness which belongs to the holy angels who remained steadfast by free will, while others fell by free will.

2). *The Loss of Liberty.* The first man lost his blessedness by sin. And we cannot, says Augustine, imagine a more grievous sin,—“How great was the guilt of sinning when it was so easy not to sin.” (1). Self-love took the place of love to God,—“The first ruin of man was the love of self,” (*Sermon* 96, 2). (2). The soul being deprived of the “assistance” lost the dominion over its former servant, the body, and then arose the fleshly mind, *concupiscentia*. The arising of concupiscence in its narrower sense appears to have been, in his thought, the first and most destructive result of the fall. Yet he includes under the term *concupiscentia* the general turning toward “lower mutable and uncertain things” which accompanies the turning away from the immutable good. (3). Along with this loss of the assisting grace was also lost the ability to will the good, “The hard necessity of possessing sin followed the sinner.” “Just condemnation followed; the deserter of eternal life was condemned with eternal death” Here then we see that sin and the punishment of sin come together; for, says Augustine, “What other evil can be mentioned except absence of good.” “There was first death of the soul when God left it, as there is of the body when the soul leaves it.”

3). *The Effects Upon Posterity.* Augustine distinguishes between actual sin and “original sin,” but he seems to connect out-breaking sin closely with original sin. Adam’s descendants, even if they have in their lives no actual sin, have yet “original sin.” It follows from *Rom.* 5:12 that we were all in him,—“all sinned in Adam when in his nature, by virtue of that innate power whereby

he was able to produce them, they being up to that time all that one Adam," (*On Sin*, etc., 3, 7, 14).

All men are partakers of transgression because they are born of carnal concupiscence,—“It is the daughter of sin, as it were; and it becomes also the mother of many sins. Now, from this concupiscence, whatever comes into being by natural birth, is bound by original sin, unless indeed it be born again in Him whom the Virgin conceived without this concupiscence,” (*On Marriage*, etc., 1, 27). From the first evil will of man there is contracted, according to Augustine, “an action which might be called hereditary.”

[A clear exposition of these views may be found in *Shedd* II, pp. 76–92, and *Meyer's Romans*, pp. 192–208; also President Dwight's Notes, pp. 221–224.]

4. *On Grace and Justification.* 1) *Grace is a helping compassion.* The actual forgiveness of sins is only one of its workings; there are others more important. In its real nature grace is the *imparting of strength*, an *inspiratio bonae voluntatis*. Or, since a good will is only possible to the one who is cleaving unto God, to adhere to God or to love God is an “*inbreathing of blessedness*.”

2). *No real distinction is made between prevenient and subsequent grace*;—“God begins his influence by working in us that we may have the will, and completes it by working with us when we have the will. We can do nothing to effect good works of piety without Him, He either working *that* we may will, or co-operating *when we will*,” (*On Grace*, etc., 1, 33). With this kept in mind it is easy to see the distinction between the “assistance” of *redeeming* grace, and that belonging to man's first state. In the first state grace is an assistance *without which a thing does not come to pass*. Redeeming grace is an assistance with which a thing comes to pass;—“He came that we might be called,” and the elect *are* called with a suitable calling, a *Congrua Vocatione*.—For not all who are called are called effectively. The faith which is the basis of the Christian life, is itself a gift of God.

Yet it is characteristic of Augustine's doctrine of grace that through the mediation of *Gal.* 5:13, 14, and of *James* 2; the conception of faith passed over into that of love;—“*That one believes in Christ who hopes in Christ*; for if he have faith without hope and love, he believes Christ *to be*, but does not believe in Christ. He who believes in Christ is made a member of His body, which cannot take place except hope and love be added,” (*Sermon* 144, 2, 2). Faith, the spirit, grace, are interchangeable terms; for the

grace of the New Testament is love, and faith is "that which works through love," and the spirit is the "spirit of love."

3.) *God's definite purpose to save some, —Predestination;*—It is this grace alone which saves,—“God rendering good for evil through grace, which is not bestowed according to our merit,” (*On Grace* etc., 5, 12). “*Gratia*, unless it is *grace* is not *gratia*,” (*Enchirid.* 107). Predestination must therefore be asserted in order that the true grace of God,—that which is bestowed not according to our merit, may be able to be defended by an insurmountable protection.

While God left a part of mankind to the self-incurred condemnation,—and in this sense “justly predestinated them to punishment or to death,” He elected a certain number out of the same “mass of perdition” whom He graciously predestinated to grace. “not because we would have been holy but in order that we might be holy.” “And whom He foreknew that He should predestinate He predestinated that He should call; He called that He might justify; He justified that He might glorify,” (*On Romans* 8:28, 29).

That God calls some men “not according to merit,” justifies some of these same, and gives to some of the justified the gift of perseverance,—this is loving kindness. That He does not give these gifts of grace to all—this belongs to His inscrutable judgment, (*Rom* 9:20, 21). In helping himself over *I Timothy* 2:4 he says, “We may understand by ‘all men,’ *every sort of men*, and we may interpret it in any other way we please, so long as we are not compelled to believe that the Omnipotent God *has willed* anything to be done which was not done,” (*Enchirid.* 103, 27). See also *On Rebuke and Grace*, 44 and 47.

4). *On justification.* With Augustine to justify is the same thing as to renew, —“Being justified signifies being made righteous by Him who justifies the ungodly man that he may become a godly man instead,” (*de spir. et lit.* 26, 45).

This justification is wrought by the Holy Spirit who inspires good desire in the place of evil concupiscence, shedding abroad love in our hearts;—“The Holy Ghost, by whose gift there springs up in the mind a delight in, and a love of that supreme and unchangeable good which is God,” (3, 6). It is true that Augustine says much of justification by faith,—The just shall live by faith; By the *law* God shows man his infirmity in order that fleeing to His compassion by faith he might be saved: What the law of works enjoins by menace, the law of faith secures by believing, etc.—But the

faith here intended is love, longing and praying and holding itself upon God. Justification comes by faith, which is active in love, the inbreathing of blessedness,—“Therefore,” says Augustine, “the word of the two apostles Paul and James is not contrary to one another where one says ‘A man is justified by faith without works,’ and the other ‘Faith without works is dead,’ because one speaks of the works which precede faith, and the other of works which follow faith,” (*de diver. ques.* 75, 2).

Since being justified does away with being guilty, justification appears, in Augustine’s thought, as a single act. But this first inspiration of love is the beginning of a process which is ever incomplete in this life,—“We are justified, but that very justification increases as we advance,” (*Sermon* 158, 5). “Thus it is necessary for a man that he should not only be justified by the grace of God when he is requited with good for evil; but that, even after he has become justified by faith, grace should accompany him on his way, and he should lean upon it lest he fall,” (*On Grace and Free Will*, 13).

VI. On the Relation of Sin and Grace to the Freedom of the Will.

Augustine thought of himself as giving absolute recognition to the freedom of the will. But the will of saint and sinner alike needs the assistance of God’s grace. He distinguished, however, between the essential freedom in all acts of the human will and the true liberty of the children of God, and this fact must always be kept in mind in judging Augustine. The student should read his *Two Letters to the Monks of Adrumetum* and the Treatise which he sent them *On Grace and Free Will* (See Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. V. pp. 436–465). The following extracts will also illustrate his real point of contention with the Pelagians, namely, that grace is bestowed because of human need and not as a result of human merit:

“Two young men, . . . introducing themselves as belonging to your brotherhood, have told us . . . that certain among you preach grace in such a manner as to deny that the will of man is free; and what is a more serious matter, maintain that in the day of judgment God will not render to every man according to his works. But they also showed that many of you do not entertain this opinion but allow that free will is assisted by the grace of God so as that we may think and do right; so that when the Lord shall come to render to every man according to his works He shall find those works of ours good which God has prepared in order that we may

walk in them. They who think this think rightly," (*Letter I.* p. 437.) "As far then as lay in our power we have used our influence with them . . . with a view to their persevering in the soundness of the catholic faith, which neither denies free will, whether for an evil or a good life, nor attributes to it so much power that it can avail anything without God's grace, whether that it may be changed from evil to good, or that it may persevere in the pursuit of good, or that it may attain to eternal good when there is no further fear of failure," (*Letter II.* p. 439).

"Now He has revealed to us through His Holy Scriptures, that there is in a man a free choice of will. But how he has revealed this I do not recount in human language, but in divine. There is, to begin with, the fact that God's precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless he had free choice of will, so that by performing them he might obtain the promised reward," (*On Grace and Free Will*, 2.).

"Now wherever it is said 'Do not do this, and do not do that,' and wherever there is any requirement in the divine admonitions for the will to do anything, there is at once a sufficient proof of free will. No man, therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute the fault to himself. Nor does it detract at all from a man's own will when he performs any act in accordance with God. Indeed, a work is then to be pronounced a good one when a person does it willingly; then, too, may the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him concerning whom it is written, 'He shall reward every man according to his works,' " (4.). "What, indeed, affords clearer evidence of the grace of God than the acceptance of prayer in any petition? If our Savior had only said, 'Watch that ye enter not into temptation,' he would appear to have done nothing further than admonish man's will; but since He added the words, 'and pray,' He showed that God helps us not to enter into temptation," (9.). "This free will of man the Apostle Paul appeals to in the case of others also, as when he says to them, 'We beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain.' Now how could he so enjoin them if they received God's grace in such a manner as to lose their own will? Nevertheless, lest the will itself should be deemed capable of doing any good thing without the grace of God, after saying, 'His grace within me was not in vain, but I have labored more abundantly than they all,' he immediately added the qualifying clause, 'Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.' In

other words, not I alone, but the grace of God with me. And thus, neither was it the grace of God alone, nor was it he himself alone, but it was the grace of God with him," (12). "There is always with us a free will,—but it is not always good; for it is either free from righteousness when it serves sin,—and then it is evil; or else it is free from sin when it serves righteousness,—and then it is good. But the grace of God is always good; and by it it comes to pass that a man is of a good will, though he was before of an evil one. By it also it comes to pass that the very good will, which has now begun to be, is enlarged and made so great that it is able to fulfill the divine commandments which it shall wish, when it shall once firmly and perfectly wish. . . . The man who wills but is not able knows that he does not yet fully will, and prays that he may have so great a will that it may suffice for keeping the commandments. And thus, indeed, he receives assistance to perform what he is commanded. Then is the will of use when we have ability; just as ability is also then of use when we have the will. For what does it profit us if we will what we are unable to do, or else do not will what we are able to do?" (31. [15]).

VII. The Relation of His Doctrine of Grace to his Common Catholic Views and to His Neo-Platonic Conceptions.

1). To understand Augustine's doctrine of grace, it is important to observe that the remission of sins has only a very subordinate place in it, for when it comes to the *doctrine* of grace the remission is only a less important accompaniment of the inbreathing of blessedness. This is said notwithstanding the fact that, (1) he knows how to praise thankfully the remission in baptism, and is deeply imbued with a sense of the necessity of continued remission for the baptised who continually commit light sins,—“The rest of our life, from the time that we have the use of reason, furnishes constant occasion for the remission of sins however great may be our advance in righteousness,” (*Enchirid.* 64, 17). And notwithstanding, (2) that practically as a Christian and a preacher he has a lively experience of the significance of trust in sin-forgiving grace; —“For not our merit but His compassion gives unto us trust in Him,” (*On Ps.* 88, 1).

But God is not thought of as affected by our sin. Sin as a deserting of good, and as an absence of good, carries its punishment only in itself, and is not able to affect God in His supra-mundane completeness;—“When God is said to be angry with the wicked and gentle with the good, *they* are changed not He. Just as light

is harsh to weak eyes, but mild to strong eyes because of change in them of course, and not in it, "(*On Trin.* 5, 16, 17). "That we have been reconciled unto God by the death of His Son must not be so understood as if the Son had reunited us so that He began to love those whom He had hated, . . . but we have been reconciled to Him who loved us, but toward whom because of our sins we had hostility," (*On John* 101, 6).

It is not the guilt exactly but the "not being joined to God" which separates between God and men. The right relation is brought to pass not by the "receiving of remission," but by "the inbreathing of love."

2). It is also true that faith in the historic Christ is not an ultimate aim. At first just the opposite seems to be true, for at Augustine's conversion the person of Christ was so important to him that he makes Christ alone the mediator between God and man. It was even he who prepared the way in the West for a new religious appreciation of the historic Christ depending upon the Bible. Along with Ignatius, Irenaeus and Origen the Mediator with Augustine is the *man* Christ Jesus. While as the *Word* He was equal with the Father yet Augustine emphasized Christ's *humanity*,—"We believe that God was made man for us as an example of humility and to show forth the love of God toward us. For this is of profit to us to believe and to hold firm and unshaken in our hearts, that the *humility* by which God was born of a woman and was led through such contumely at the hands of mortals to death is the best medicine to cure the tumor of our pride and the best sacrament by which to loose the chain of sin," (*On Trin.* 8, 5, 7).

Yet when we come to Augustine's doctrine we find it only partially corresponding to these conceptions. However much he emphasizes the grace of forgiveness it is still the grace of inbreathing which really saves. And to this grace Christ is only the *way*. Faith and the historic Christ stand midway between estrangement from God and cleaving unto God. The infused grace, that inbreathing of blessedness which is the foundation of this "Cleaving unto God," is not obtained from the historic Christ;—"Let each one receive as he is able; let him not depart from Christ born after the flesh until he has reached Christ born from the Father above," (*On John* 2, 17). "Through the Word made flesh to the Word who in the beginning was God with God," (13).

"They who are not yet capable of the knowledge of spiritual and eternal things are nourished by the faith of temporal history

which is used for our salvation by the goodness and wisdom of God, by which being cleansed and being rooted in love is able to run with the saints, being no longer a child for milk," (*On Ps.* 8, 5). Here the mysticism of the "being rooted in love" would seem to neutralize historical christianity.

3). There is also some question whether even the word of truth and the sacrament really effect grace, though he says that "spiritually we are born of the word and the sacraments." For he says elsewhere, "Many hear the word of truth, but some hear and some are disobedient," (*On Predes.* 6, 11). "In vain does one labor in preaching to build up faith except God in compassion build it within," (7, 12). "Far removed from the senses of the flesh is this school where the Father is heard and teaches," (8, 13). Augustine doubtless drew from his own experience and he illustrates it by emphasizing the distinction between *vox*, the word which sounds without, and the *Verbum*. The "vox" is the voice in the prophets, the voice in the apostles, the voice in the gospels, etc. But when we come to "In the beginning was the Word,"—the *Verbum*, then "voices" diminish and the Word increases. In the *Confessions* Augustine certainly brings out very strongly the difference between Neo-Platonic philosophy and Christianity, although it still remains true that "the Neo-Platonists see whither we must go, but see not by what way." But Augustine's mystical ideas do not grow directly out of his completed conceptions; they are only occasional outgrowths and are not really dangerous because they lead out consistently into positive Christianity. And he says that for himself "faith" remained unshakably firm "by which I believe Thee to be, and to have given us the way of human salvation in Jesus Christ, Thy Son our Lord, and in the Holy Scriptures which the authority of thy catholic church commended," (*Confes.* 7, 7, 11). When we come to the consideration of the sacraments the student will be able to judge whether in Augustine's thought they really conveyed grace or not.

VIII. His Conception of the Church and the Sacraments.

1). *The church* is a mixed church. For while teaching that in the future ages the church will be pure, he sees here and now the mingling of good and evil. There is a true and an apparent Body of the Lord. In the one house of God there are vessels of honor and dishonor, but the "vessels of honor" are the only ones so within the house that they themselves "are that same house of God."

This true house of God "is in the good, faithful and holy servants of God everywhere scattered, and bound together by a spiritual unity into the same communion of sacraments, whether they know one another or not; but others I have said are in the house of the Lord in such manner that they do not belong to the structure of the house," (*On Bap.* 7, 51, 91). "Many such are in the communion of sacraments with the church, and yet are not in the church," (*On Unity*, 25, 70). "For he is forever separated from that church which is without spot or wrinkle, who in his carnal obduracy has also mingled with the congregation of the holy," (*On Bap.* 1, 17, 26).

We find in Augustine two conceptions of the church which unquestionably run counter to each other,—(1). The *common catholic*, in which the church is that hierarchical saving institution which will even make use of force to bring back wandering sheep to salvation—compel them to come in. (2). An *ethical religious conception* in which the church is the congregation of the saints, contained within the visible church, and not separable from it by man. These conceptions do not, however, necessarily exclude one another. We find both of them in the Middle Ages. They do not exclude one another so long as the saints attain their salvation purely through the medium of the church.

2). *The sacraments* are, universally considered, the rites which unite the religious community as such together,—“Men can be united into no name of religion whether false or true except they are gathered into a society by some sort of visible sign or sacrament,” (*Against Faustus*. 19, 11). And again he says, (*de civ. Dei*. 10, 5),—“*Sacramentum* is the same as *sacrum signum*,” which, as it will be observed, is not the same as Cyprian’s conception.

Objects or actions become sacraments in so far as by their silent speech, or by means of the relation they bear to the language of the ritual, they point to a *sacra res*, “for what else are these material sacraments but as it were visible words,” (*Against Faustus* 19, 16). While Augustine recognized various customs and rites as sacraments on christian soil,—the salt which catechumens received in place of the Eucharist; ordination; marriage;—yet he thought of baptism and the Lord’s Supper as the most important sacraments. They are visible signs of divine things, but the invisible things are themselves honored in them. The sacramental element in them, the *res sacramenti*, is the *divine power of grace*. That is the sacrament, that is the virtue of the sacrament. Augustine, as we shall

see, in opposition to the Donatists, was able by means of this conception to distinguish between the performance of the Sacrament and the saving grace of the same.

While it is true that with Augustine, *baptism* is the washing of regeneration in which all sins are remitted, yet he says,—“Let him who is baptized see if he have love, and then let him say, ‘I am born of God.’ But if he have not love he has received a certain imposed character, but wanders as an alien. But if he says, ‘I have the sacrament,’ let him hear the apostle in *I Cor.* 13, 2. If I know all [*Sacramenta*] mysteries, etc., but have not love, it profiteth me nothing.” Also the Lord’s Supper gives something, “the communion of the body of Christ,” but only to believers. “Wherefore dost thou make ready teeth and belly,—*believe* and thou hast eaten,” (*On John.* 25, 12).

IX. Against the Donatists.

1). The real question to be decided was which of the two churches, both of them episcopal, was the true catholic church. *Optatus* had written against the Donatists about 368 A. D. Augustine began his opposition before 400 A. D. With the Donatists ordination by traitors and baptism by heretics were not valid. And to preserve the holiness of the church they put open sinners out of their communion until they should repent. *Optatus* had argued as to baptism that three elements are requisite, the Trinity, the minister, and the faithful recipient. The Donatists he declared exalt the second above the others, whereas God alone is the giver of grace. Of two candidates for baptism, if one renounces his sins and the other refuses to renounce, there can be no doubt as to which of the two has received baptism effectually;—“The sacraments are in themselves holy, not because of men. God cleanses, not man. The church is one whose sanctity is derived from the sacraments and does not depend upon the pride of persons.”

2). Augustine’s great argument was drawn from his emphasis of love, and the necessity of church unity. In the *Enchiridion* he says, “God must be worshipped in faith, hope, and love, . . . and without these no soul is made whole so that it is able to see God.” Faith and hope though they are the gifts of the Holy Spirit may exist outside the church. But it is inconceivable that any person should suppose that he who has not *love* belongs to the unity of the church. This love which is the *grace* of the New Testament can only be attained in the church and it cannot be preserved except in the unity of the church. Therefore it must be asserted “that the

Holy Spirit is not received except in the catholic church." It will be seen then that with Augustine unity and love are correlative conceptions in respect to the church. The inbreathing of love which is the special work of the Spirit of love or the Spirit of peace, perfects itself in the church, "invisibly and inwardly through the bonds of peace." For the church is the Body of Christ and the members are joined together "through the love of unity," and by this same love they cleave unto their Head.

3). In opposition to the Donatist conception of *baptism*, he said, "Whatever things are had of the church itself do not avail for salvation without the church;—but it is one thing not to have, and it is another thing not to have advantageously," (*On Bap.* 4, 17). By this principle he was able to explain at the same time the validity of heretical baptism and its inability to assure salvation,—"The custom is established that even a sheep which has wandered outside and by false plunderers been given the mark of the Lord, on coming back into the salvation of Christian unity is corrected of its error,—yet the mark of the Lord in it is recognized rather than condemned. For in the matter of baptism the thing to be considered is not who gives, but what he gives," (4, 10, 16).

X. The Earthly State and the Divine State

1). *The Earthly State* includes all who live "according to men." It includes in a certain sense the whole conception of worldly empire. Every state presupposes the contrast necessitated by sin, between rulers and the ruled. In the struggle of self-seeking against self-seeking, every state would be nothing but a huge theft if even this injurious power did not bring about the "earthly peace" as a relative good. It is for this reason that the Divine State observes human laws, "so far as is consistent with piety and religion," (19, 17). But real peace cannot be obtained without true justice and true virtue. These, however, are only made possible by the true knowledge of God which is possessed by the Divine State. Princes may be citizens of the Divine State, "if they use their power especially to extend the worship of God in the service of His majesty," (5, 24).

2). *The Divine State* is the Bride of Christ; that which endures earth hoping for heaven; wanders in the course of time as a pilgrim among the unholy,—all the faithful who are, and who have been before us and who will be after us; those who are predestinated to reign forever with God, whom God only knows. The Divine

State is therefore the church. The true church, the *vera ecclesia*, is the number of the predestinated;—"It remembers well that among its very enemies are many future citizens . . . and so long as it is a pilgrim in the world it has enemies united to itself by the communion of the sacraments," (1. 35).

That the true church is the number of the predestinated completes the equation of Augustine's religious ethical conception of the church. And this conception would have prevailed over his common catholic ideas if he had only possessed a criterion by which to establish predestination in the case of himself and of others; that is, if he had not felt the impossibility of determining who are the true elect. As Loofs declares, it is therefore a mistake, to call the doctrine that the church is the congregation of the elect "the pulsing heart of protestantism." It is only when it is united with the assertion that individual assurance of salvation is possible and necessary, that this doctrine receives an anti-hierarchical sense. Augustine did not possess the needed criterion, and so to him the elect, because they cannot recognize each other, are now not a communion. They can only recognize the true Divine State by a faith which sees the perfect which is to be. It was this, together with the fact that the church occupied a position of "authority" which helped to make it easy to have the Divine State identified with the hierarchical church. He also often demands the service of the state for the church, and in this the way is prepared for the hierarchy of the Middle Ages. That these and not the other ideas of the church were the ones to be further developed, is due to the fact that they had been used by Augustine himself to enlarge the common catholic conceptions.

CHAPTER II.

PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM.

I. Historical Sketch of Pelagianism.

1). *Pelagius*, the British monk, was active as preacher and author in Rome about 400 A. D., without suspecting that he was not in harmony with the views of the church. He was possessed of earnest monkish and moralistic convictions. He says, "As often as I am called upon to speak concerning moral instruction and the manner of the holy life, I am accustomed to set forth first the power and quality of human nature and to show what it is able to do, lest the mind should be more slow and remiss toward virtue as it be-

lieves itself less able," (*To Demetrias*. 2). Meeting Augustinian ideas, partly in a caricatured form, he attacked them. His friend *Coelestius* was even more pronounced in his opposition.

2). They themselves did not at first meet with opposition. But when they left Rome in 409 or 410 fleeing before the invasion of Alaric, they came into direct connection with Augustinian influences. A vigorous controversy arose and continued with varying results until a general council in Carthage, in May, 418, condemned Pelagianism. An imperial edict being issued against Pelagius and Coelestius they left Rome and we have no further trace of them.

3). The second phase of the controversy extended from 418 to 430 A. D. *Zosimus* the bishop of Rome, who had favored the views of Pelagius, finally yielded and at a Roman council published a circular letter confirming the Carthaginian canons of condemnation. Eighteen western bishops, including bishop *Julian of Eclanum*, refused to sign the circular letter. A series of attacks and replies followed in which Julian and Augustine were the chief participants. Augustine died before completing his polemical writings against Julian. Julian and others fled to the East, and this led to the confirmation of the previous decrees against the Pelagians at the general council of Ephesus in 431 A. D.

II. The Original Pelagian Ideas of Freedom, Sin, and Grace.

[Read *Shedd II.* pp 93-102. *Schaff III.* pp. 809-815. *Fisher Hist. Doct.* pp. 176-193].

1). The doctrine of Pelagius was based on the conviction that the freedom of the will to choose either right or wrong *is an inalienable natural good*;—"This very fact that we are able to do evil is itself a good . . . because it makes the choice of the good a better act," (*To Demet.* 3). He admitted however "that appetite and lust being more difficult to set aside according as they are pleasant to indulge," are hindrances to perfection and difficult to overcome. But man *can* overcome them and *can be without sin*. This possibility however requires for its realization the monkish life of abstemiousness. Still Pelagius asserted that the flesh is good, and that the vice of nature does not compel us to sin. He affirmed that Jesus was not the first to live a sinless life. Old Testament saints before Him were sinless.

2). *Sin* exists only as a free act of the will, and is never anything else, "since we are always *able to do either*," (*To Demet.* 8). Pelagius was therefore compelled to deny original sin;—"Every good or evil act by means of which we are worthy of praise or blame

does not *arise with us* but is *done by us*, for we are not born full, but capable of holding either." Adam's sin injured the whole human race "only by example," and not by propagation. Here Pelagius seems to be thinking of a darkening of the understanding which stands as a director of the free will.

3). When Pelagius speaks of *grace* he means one of these three things: (a). Grace given in creation,—“We locate ability in the nature . . . This ability which is the first thing belongs properly to God who conferred it upon His creatures,” (*On Grace of Christ* 1, 54). (b). The help which God gave and continues to give for the purpose of *instructing the reason*, e.g., the Law, and the teaching and the example of Christ. (c). The remission of sins in baptism. Augustine in his book *On the Proceedings of Pelagius* [*Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series*. v. pp. 178-212], sums up the views of Pelagius;—“In order to avoid sin and to fulfill righteousness human nature can be sufficient, seeing that it has been created with freewill; and that God's grace lies in the fact that we have been so created as to be able to do this by the will, and in the future fact that God has given to us the assistance of His law and commandments, and also that he pardons sins that are past to those who are converted to him; that *in these things alone* is the grace of God to be acknowledged and not in assistance given in our single acts,” (61).

III. Julian's Positive Development of Pelagianism.

1). *Bishop Julian* showed more intellectual power in his polemics than the older Pelagians: Against the doctrine of original sin he argued the justice and goodness of God; and the meaning of sin together with the inconceivability of its propagation. And he developed original Pelagianism into a consistent Rationalism in which an Aristotelian-Stoic foundation is unmistakable. The following are some of his dicta; “What reason opposes authority cannot vindicate,”—i.e. Royal Reason is to be wholly the guide in the knowledge of God and morality even if it remove revealed dogmas. He asserted without monkish restrictions that our nature is good;—“Let the good natural concupiscence when held within its own law be polluted by no aspersion of evil.” Also for him the difference between righteous heathen and pious Christians disappears. Thus in spite of the similarity of the fundamental ideas Pelagianism received from Bishop Julian, who was a man of Greek culture and himself once married, a very different coloring from that which it had received from the monk Pelagius. But Julian's acumen was devoted to a cause already condemned.

2). Augustine's treatise *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians* written about 420 A. D., is directed chiefly against Julian (Vol. V. pp. 374-434). Note the drift of these letters from a few extracts from Augustine's treatise;—"But in defending free will they hasten to confide rather in it for doing righteousness than in God's aid, and to glory every one in himself and not in the Lord. But who of us will say that by the sin of the first man free will perished from the human race? Through sin freedom indeed perished, but it was that freedom which was in Paradise, to have a full righteousness with immortality; and it is on that account that human nature needs divine grace," (I, 5). From this the reader will see that Augustine had been contending for that conquering liberty of the Christian who is living in communion with God. "In evil, man has a free will in whom a deceiver, either secret or manifest, has grafted the love of wickedness, or he himself has persuaded himself of it. It is not therefore true as some affirm that we say, and as that correspondent of yours [Julian] ventures to write that 'all are forced into sin' as if they were unwilling, 'by the necessity of their flesh'; but if they are already of the age to use the choice of their own mind, they are not only retained in sin by their own will, but by their own will hurried along from sin to sin. For even he who persuades and deceives does not act in them except that they may commit sin by their will, either by ignorance of the truth or by delight in iniquity or by both evil," (I, 6 f.). "But concerning the concupiscence of the flesh of which they speak, I believe that they are deceived or that they deceive; for with this even he that is baptized must struggle with a pious mind, however carefully he presses forward and is led by the spirit of God. But although this is called sin it is certainly so called not because it is sin, but because it is made by sin,—as a writing is said to be some one's 'hand' because the hand has written it . . . And these sins are committed whether by acting, or by speaking, or—and this is the easiest and the quickest—by thinking. From all, which things, what believer ever will boast that he has his heart pure?" (I, 28). "Baptism washes away indeed all sins—absolutely all sins, whether of deeds or words or thoughts, whether original or added, whether such as are committed in ignorance or allowed in knowledge: but it does not take away the weakness which the regenerate man resists when he fights the good fight, but to which he consents when as a man he is overtaken in any fault; on account of the former, rejoicing with thanksgiving, but on account of the

latter, groaning in the utterance of prayers," (3, 5). "From this it results that the virtue which is now in the righteous man is named perfect up to this point, that to its perfection belong both the true knowledge and humble confession of even imperfection itself . . . imperfect, to wit, in the thought of how much is wanting in him of that righteousness for the fulness of which he is still hungering and thirsting; but perfect in that he does not blush to confess his own imperfection and goes forward in good that he may attain it," (3, 19). "For they think that by the strength of their own will, they will fulfill the commands of the law and, wrapped up in their pride, they are not converted to assisting grace; or by thinking that they do it, although they do it not with spiritual love which is of God . . . Which may be thus more clearly and briefly stated. That the righteousness of the law is not fulfilled when the law commands and man as it were of his own strength obeys; but when the Spirit aids, and man's free will, but freed by the grace of God, performs, (3, 20).

"The Pelagians, then, are pressed with these and such like testimonials and words of truth, not to deny original sin; not to say that the grace of God whereby we are justified is not given freely but according to our merits; not to say that in mortal man however holy and well doing, there is so great righteousness that even after the working of regeneration until he finish this life of his, forgiveness of sins is not necessary to him," (3, 24). "This is now enough in opposition to those who by freedom of will desire to destroy the liberality of grace," (4, 16).

3). Although Pelagianism was condemned by the synodical canons it is worthy of note that only the following points of Augustine's doctrine were accepted. (1). That Adam became mortal by the fall. (2). Children, on the basis of *Rom.* 5, 12, are to be baptized for the remission of sins. (3). The conception of grace—to be found in Tertullian and Cyprian as well as in Augustine—as an inner imparting of ability to do good,—“Whoever says that the grace of God by which we are justified in Christ, avails only for the forgiveness of sins already committed and does not also avail for assistance so that they may not be committed, is anathema,” (*Canon* 4). (4). The denial of sinless perfection here on earth. But these are all earlier ideas and so far also common catholic conceptions, which Augustine deepened, but did not originate.

[For an extended analytical discussion of the Pelagian and Augustinian principles, see *Neander's Church History* Rev. Ed. II pp. 658-687].

IV. Semi-Pelagianism.

[Read *Schaff III.* pp. 857-870. *Shedd II.* pp. 102-110. *Fisher* 194-204. *Neander II* pp. 687-722].

Some of the advocates of Augustine's views, as we have already seen in the case of the monks of Adrumetum, did not grasp the true conception of his teaching of the working of grace. Certain it is that his opponents seemed to see in his doctrine not only prevenient aid and the reverent dependence of the Christian upon God for salvation, but an election of God to evil as well as to good, an interpretation which would reduce Augustine's world of human freedom, into one of mechanical determinism. An examination of the common catholic views in this period, to the death of *Gregory the Great*, (†604) is not only interesting but practically necessary to an understanding of the development of Semi-Pelagian views in the church.

The real friends of genuine Augustinianism, like *Prosper of Aquitania* who began his defense of grace and freedom as early as the year 432, were neither able to make these views dominant nor to improve the statement of them. An anonymous author also sought to give validity both to the doctrine of predestination and to *I Tim.* 2, 4, by making a distinction between general grace, and that particular grace which is to be found active in those who are actually experiencing the divine blessedness. Rome in the mean time was content to find fault with those who "called up questions against order," to impose silence upon "reprobates," and to praise as one of the best masters "Augustine of blessed memory."

Some of those before the time of Gregory the Great, who did not accept Augustine's doctrine were the following :

1). *Jerome* (†420). Although Jerome had agreed with Augustine as to original sin, this was due largely to his monkish condemnation of the flesh, and to exegetical reasons. While he therefore joined Augustine against Pelagius he was never a genuine Augustinian. He knows nothing of the sole efficiency of grace, or of a predestination independent of foreknowledge. The following phrases are suggestive of his position:—"We understand that it is not alone our power to do what we will, but of God's mercy if He assist our will." "It lies in our will to do good or evil." "The free will itself strives after or depends upon the assistance of God and is in need of His riches."

2). *John Cassian* who lived till sometime between 440-450, and who founded the monastery of St. Victor near Marseilles, is gener-

ally referred to as the father of Semi-Pelagianism. He was emphatic in opposition to extreme statements, both of free will and of efficient grace. He opposed alike those who denied all prevenient grace or always made grace dependent on man's desert, and those who affirmed that grace must always be prevenient. According to Neander he considered it human presumption to try to explore and define what is unsearchable to human reason. Grace and free will are too much blended and fused into each other for such decisions. So that in trying to answer in a presumptuous manner the question whether free will depends on grace, or grace on free will, both sides have fallen into errors. Cassian's practical trend leads him to say,—“In conversion the beginning is made sometimes by God's prevenient grace as in the case of Paul, and sometimes by the human desire as in the case of Zaccheus.” *On Tim.* 2, 4, he says: “All who perish, perish against the will of God.” “There remains in man always the free will which can refuse or accept the grace of God.”

The real point of difference between Augustine and the Massilians, was that Augustine ascribed the salvation of the redeemed *alone* to God's grace; they ascribed to every man the determination of his own destiny. On this difference Loofs remarks that there was right and wrong on both sides—but unequally. For as an expression of a judgment of one's self before God, Augustine was wholly right and the Semi-Pelagians wholly wrong. Whereas as a theory of conversion, both views were misleading because of the mistaken theory of grace presupposed by both which must either destroy itself entirely, or set aside on the other hand every capacity of right decision in man.

3). *Vincent, Monk in Lerins* wrote, in 434, his book *Commonitorium* which was indirectly aimed against Augustine as the introducer of novelty,—“Let the new cease to assail the old,” (2, 32). There can be no uncertainty as to Vincent's loyalty to strictly catholic views and hence to the fact that opposition to Augustine came also from this quarter. No *wish for knowledge* should lead to a failure to observe the canon that—“All who will anchor in the safe haven of the church, accept what they can understand of the dogma of the church, and what they cannot understand they believe.” Vincent asks, “How can I, in a certain and regular and general way, discern between the truth of catholic faith and the falsity of heretical perverseness?” And he answers, “In two ways; first by the authority of the divine law; and second,—especially because Scripture



is capable of various interpretations,—by the tradition of the catholic church.” Then follows the famous sentence,—“In the catholic church itself, special care must be taken that we hold *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est*, for this is truly and properly catholic; and this will come to pass if we follow the universal, the ancient, the agreed upon.” Or as some one has expressed this common catholic view,—“The dogmas of the heavenly philosophy may by the operation of time be smoothed and polished; they gain in the way of greater fulness of evidence and elucidation; but they must of necessity retain their integrity and all essential characteristics.”

4). *Faustus of Rhegium* (†491), was one of the ablest advocates of Semi-Pelagian views to be found in Southern Gaul during the second half of the 5th Century. He forced Lucidus, one of his presbyters who was an ultra predestinarian to recant. The synod of *Arles* in 475 was held on purpose to oppose predestinationists,—and this too in that Gallic territory where next to Africa Augustine's influence had been greatest. At the synod of *Lyons* in 476, Faustus was appointed to set forth the right doctrine, which he did, in what is the most important document of Semi-Pelagianism, *On Grace and Free Will*, in which he opposed both “the pestiferous Pelagians,” and the “error of predestination.” This book was even quoted as an authority in 519, by Possessor, an African Bishop.

5). By the year 529, a mild reaction had come in the churches of Southern Gaul through the efforts of *Avitus of Vienne* and *Caesarius of Arles*. As a result of the two councils of *Orange* and *Valence* in 529, the Semi-Pelagian system was condemned but without the mention of the names of its advocates, and the Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace was affirmed without particularistic predestination. But by taking *saving grace* as equivalent to *the grace of baptism*, Augustine's ideas were limited by common catholic conception. Schaff summarizes a few of the propositions which he considers very important;—“Grace is not merely bestowed when we pray for it, but grace itself causes us to pray for it.” “Unmerited grace precedes meritorious works.” “Even had not man fallen, he would have needed divine grace for salvation.” “When man sins he does his own will; when he does good, he executes the will of God, yet voluntarily.” The love of God is itself a gift of God.” Loofs however sees in the creed-like ending that which even more clearly limited Augustine's conceptions;—“This also do we believe in accordance with the catholic

faith, that after grace received through baptism all the baptized are able and ought with the aid and co-operation of Christ to fulfill all duties needful for salvation, provided they are willing to labor faithfully. But that some men are predestinated by divine power to evil, we not only do not believe, but if there be those who are willing to believe so evil a thing, we say to them with all abhorrence, anathema,"

Boniface I (520-532), approved this confession of the fourteen bishops in a letter to Caesarius, and herewith the Semi-Pelagian controversy was ended without being settled. In reality however it was only the common catholic conceptions which Augustine himself shared, that seem later to have driven out everything which could not be harmonized with themselves and to have assimilated the rest.

5. It was however *Gregory the Great* (590-†604), who did more than any one else to establish Semi-Pelagianism in the church. Standing between antiquity and the middle ages, he shows us the tradition of the ancient church, especially the Augustinian, in that abridgement in which it became the foundation of catholicism in the middle ages. He was not a creative spirit. What he introduced into dogmatic tradition he either borrowed or took out of the popular conception of Christianity; e. g. the Order of Angels; Purgatory; stronger emphasis upon the *Intercession* of Christ and the Saints; Masses for souls; etc.

1). *Gregory's doctrine of Grace* was developed from that of Augustine. Gregory therefore speaks of gratuitous grace, and of predestination and the mystery which it contains for us. He held that the grace of God works *preveniens*. Divine grace is also said to work *co-operans* or *subsequens*. "lest we should will in vain."

Yet Gregory says,—“The good works which are thus wrought are both of God's omnipotence and of ourselves,” (*On Ezk.* 1, 9, 2). And in his exposition of *I Kings* 5, 4, 9, he says the certain and definite number of the elect, “was predestinated of God because he saw” who would persevere in faith and good works; and the place of the reprobates was prepared for them with the evil spirits, because of the iniquity which was foreknown of them before the foundation of the world.” And since the forgiveness of sins won by the redemption of Christ is first the forgiveness of original sin in baptism, the baptized person seems to be directed by the help of secretly working grace, to work out his own salvation through repentance and good works.

The fundamental agreement of Gregory and Augustine may be seen in the following sentence which was used by both. While their fundamental difference stands out clearly in the conclusions drawn from it:

"Divine grace precedes in every good work and our free will follows."

Gregory:—"Therefore we ourselves are said to free ourselves, because we consent to the Lord's freeing us," (*Moralium* 24, 20, 24).

Augustine:—"Therefore work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who worketh in you," (*On Grace, etc.*, 21).

2). *Gregory's new emphasis of merits and intercession*;—Ideas which in Augustine were in the extreme background were brought out by Gregory into dogmatic theory;—"They who confide in no good work of their own, run to the protection of the holy martyrs; apply themselves with weeping to their sacred persons, and pray that by their [martyrs'] intercessions they may themselves merit mercy," (*Moral.* 6, 61, 54). And as the *merits* of the saints justify the petitioner in this intercession, so Christ by virtue of His sinless life appears to be the Intercessor above all the saints. There is here a beginning of a *merit of Christ* reaching out beyond His historical life.

The value of these intercessions is to be found in the conceptions of penance and purgatory. The principle was operative that "sin is in no wise remitted without punishment," (*Merit.* 9, 34, 54). Both the severer *penitentia*, and the satisfaction for light sins, which in the 2nd Century were only a *sign* of penitence for the church, have now come to be works of penance. And in this sense they are anticipations of divine punishment. Gregory by the use of the old idea of the *fire of purgatory*, left open the possibility of further performance of these penances on the other side of the grave.

3). *The sacrifice of the mass*:—By his conception of the sacrifice of the mass, Gregory added value to the intercessions offered in behalf of the doers of penance here and in purgatory. The Lord's Supper,—*encharistia*; *missa*; *communio*; *oblatio hostia*,—as it is to be found liturgically celebrated in the Roman church today, rests back on Gregory. To Gregory the mass is that "ineffable sacrament of divine grace in which Christ is wholly present in the individual portions," so that it is an actual repetition of the sacrifice of Christ;—"For as oft as we offer to Him the *host of his passion* we repeat His passion for our absolution," (*Homilies* 37, 7). Loofs calls



attention to the fact that here for the first time we have a consummation in a real way of ideas which found expression in Lyons as early as 177, A. D.

The Lord's Supper considered as such a sacrifice became an especial means of grace for the dead. Under the circumstances therefore the commemoration of the saints in the mass because calling attention to their *merits* was likely to result in giving much greater prominence to the saints than they already had in Gregory's thought.

4). *His idea of the church*;—Here Augustine's conception is brought down to the common catholic level. For although Gregory continues to consider the holy church as the "congregation of the saints," yet, after all, the *civitas dei* as it is to be found in the world, is practically the same as the hierarchical church with the pope at its head. And what is vastly more important, the saints already attain their salvation through this church. She it is who sacrifices for her members, and possesses that which the Head has won. In fact it is through her baptism, preaching, penance, and mass that she becomes the institution *which mediates salvation*. Every christian is dependent upon her, for no one can be certain or dare to be certain of his salvation.

Only broken fragments of Augustine's mysticism, and a remnant of his spiritualism remained. The common catholic estimate of the saints, and especially of baptism contradicts the actual regenerating power of grace by means of the word. In this unreconciled contradiction there remained an idea which when modified in the time of the Reformation received a new significance. Augustine's immediate successors however inherited only his churchly garments. They did not inherit his spirit.

CHAPTER III.

ROMAN CATHOLICISM IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES (600-1050 A. D.)

I. The General Situation.

1). From the time of Gregory the Great, the center of gravity in the Western church falls increasingly within the newly won German Romanic nations. Gregory sought to unite to Rome the national churches which had arisen, or were arising there. But it was not until Charlemagne's time 200 years later that the development which had been begun by Gregory found its temporary conclusion in the renewing of the Roman Empire on German soil, and the close union of the "Head of the church," with the new "*dominus mundi*." Even at this time the Western church had become Romish. The primacy of the pope over the church, met with only transitory opposition after the early part of the middle ages. In spite of *Matt.* 16, 18, the pope's position was however more a question of church government than of doctrine. And yet the development of the papal primacy is one of the most important elements for the history of doctrine in this period.

2). Early in this period the church was the educational institution for the youthful nations. It was its *means* of teaching, that is, its *institutions* which experienced important development during this time. We are to observe how far in church practice, and consequently in literature there followed a further development of the two churchly institutions in which dogmatic tradition reached the common life of the people, viz. the *mass*; *penance* and *indulgence*.

II. General Attitude Toward Augustinian Tradition.

1). The development of the doctrine of Grace in the middle ages was connected with Augustine only in the form which it had received from Gregory the Great. Even the renaissance of Augustinianism by many theologians of the 11th, 12th and 13th Centuries was not able to reach back of Gregory. It is an interesting fact and one which shows how far men had gone from Augustinian tradition, that the confession of faith which was inserted in the *Carolinian Books* as a proof of the orthodoxy of the Frankish church and which was highly prized during all the middle ages and called the *symbol* of Jerome or *Sermo* of Augustine, was no other than Pelagius' *libellus fidei ad Innocentium*!

2). There was an evident renaissance of Augustinianism in the 9th Century. And as no doctrine of Augustine's had as yet



been condemned by leading authority, there might have been a reaction developed against Semi-Pelagianism. But the Gottschalk controversy ended in favor of Semi-Pelagianism, which as far as possible used Augustinian formulas.

Gottschalk (†868) seemed to be interested only in predestination. While his positive expressions as to predestinating *grace* were Augustinian his apparent teaching of a predestination which made God the author of evil and which forced men to sin was not Augustinian;—"I, Gottschalk, believe and profess that predestination is double both of the elect to peace and of the reprobate to death." But even this expression was capable of a true Augustinian interpretation. Even Gottschalk affirmed that reprobates were condemned through God's "just judgment to deservedly just death." But as a result of this *particular* divine purpose of grace Gottschalk expressly asserted that Christ did not die for the reprobate.

3). *Rabanus Maurus* and *Hincmar* condemned Gottschalk at Mayence in 848, and at Quersy in 849 and 853. They both held to the predestination of the saints, but they established it upon foreknowledge. They thought like Gregory the Great. But Maurus and Hincmar found more opponents than allies among the theologians of their time. *John Scotus* alone, was on their side. In the great synods of 859 and 860 the dogmatic questions were postponed so that the practical victory remained with Hincmar.

(Read *Schaff* iv. pp 522-543. *Fisher Hist. Doc* p 206 f. *Neander* iii. pp. 472-494).

III. The Development of the Mass.

(Read *Schaff* ii. pp. 543-572. *Fisher* pp. 207-211. *Neander* iii. pp. 494-530.

1). The more extravagant the supposed effects of the *mass* the more the laity were ready to believe that in the mass the real body of Christ was partaken. Although among theologians there could be found those who held the realistic conception of Ambrose and Gregory the Great, yet the earnest study of Augustine had brought with it the preponderance of the symbolic conception. But the *res sacramenti* was thought of as more closely connected with the *signum* than had been the case with Augustine. Even according to the symbolic conception there was present to faith a divine life energy in the consecrated elements, and by consecration the elements became something which they were not before. The period of Charles the Bald, however, marks the turning point after which *popular* conceptions came to have a definite influence on theological

tradition. At the beginning of this development stands the first dogmatic treatise on the Lord's Supper written in 831 by *Parchasius Radbert*.

2). *The view of Radbert* is a strong mingling of the spiritual and the *gross*—the latter being by far the most prominent factor.

The believer knows that by a miracle of divine omnipotence there is present in the sacrament "in the figure of bread and wine, after the consecration, the flesh and blood of Christ,—evidently nothing else than what was born of Mary, suffered on the cross, and was raised from the grave." The elements are not however changed to bodily sight and taste "*outwardly* in kind, but *inwardly* that they may be perceived by faith," (1, 5). "The bread and wine are *inwardly* changed into the body and blood of Christ," (3, 2). "Because it would not be suitable that Christ should be eaten with the teeth He willed that in this mystery, by the consecration of the Holy Spirit, the bread and wine should be made flesh and blood. In that creation he is mysteriously sacrificed daily for the life of the world," (4, 1). "It is not the priest who creates the body of Christ. If this were possible, which is absurd—he would become the creator of the Creator," (12, 2).

Yet a remnant of the *spiritual* conception appears most plainly in the fact that according to Radbert all receive the sacrament of the altar, that is, the *signa*, but one "spiritually eats the flesh and drinks the blood of Christ, while another does not," (6, 2).

3). *The formulas of Ratramnus*;—So far as we know the only two writers who opposed Radbert's view were Rabanus Maurus and Ratramnus. Ratramnus, in his treatise which was prepared after 844 at the request of Charles the Bald, says definitely,—"*The spiritual flesh which is taken into the mouth of the faithful, and the spiritual blood are different from the flesh which was crucified,*" (71). But he also says, "That bread which through the ministry of the priest becomes the body of Christ, appears one thing to the human senses and proclaims another thing within, to the minds of the faithful. Without, indeed, it is bread as it was before, its color, form, taste are evident; but within, it is perceived to be something far more precious," (9).—Here however, Ratramnus does not have in mind the presence of the historic Christ, for he elsewhere says, "Under cover of corporeal things *divine virtue* dispenses more secretly a salvation for those who accept it in faith," (40). Yet he comes to speak like Radbert,—"*According to an invisible substance [the power of the divine Word] there exist the*

body and blood of Christ."

It will be seen that so far as *formulas* go there is hardly any difference remaining between the symbolic conception and that of Radbert. But strangely enough the future belonged to Radbert's view for this very reason.


4). Transubstantiation came to be followed by *private masses*. For now it was not only believed that the sacrifice of Christ on Golgotha was repeated in the mass, but what was still more important, there was now also a theoretical justification for the performance of masses without communicants. As was declared by *Strabo* (†849),—"The *sacrifice* of the mass, as contrasted with the observance of the sacrament, now obtained an independent value,"—that is, not only apart from real faith in the mind of the communicant, but apart from the communicant himself.

IV. The Sacraments of Penance and of Indulgence.

1. *How these arose:—1*). In the Carolinian period there was an attempt to revive the public *penance* discipline of the 5th and 6th Centuries in the case of offences which were *legally* punishable. But it proved impracticable. For special cases public penance with temporary excommunication still remained in force *de jure*, but all consistent exercise of it was wanting. As early as 459, Leo the Great, condemned the *public* reading of a penitential confession. The private confession with penance took on an entirely new significance after it ceased to limit itself to what the old church called "deadly sins." With Tertullian, for example, these were idolatry, gluttony, homicide, adultery, debauchery, false testimony, fraud.

2). John Cassian, who followed Eastern monkish precedents, sets forth eight *principal sins*;—gluttony, fornication, avarice, wrath, melancholy, anxiety, vain glory, pride. Gregory the Great mentions seven, which later became known as the *seven chief sins*. Gregory says the root of all evil is pride; out of this grows the seven principle vices,—vain glory, hatred, wrath, dejection, avarice, gluttony, luxuriousness. Dante divides his purgatory on the chief sins.

3). The confusing of the seven chief sins with the seven deadly sins was unavoidable, and favored the extension of penance to sins of thought. As a result the line of separation between mortal and venial sins became indefinite. Private confession and penance for sins of thought came first to the surface in the Irish monkish church. Here about 500, A. D., appeared the oldest of the books of penance used in this practice—*Penitentiale Vinniani*.



From Ireland the new penance spread to the Anglo-Saxons and thence to the continent. Deadly sins in the new sense could be ascribed to anyone. By the Carolinian period confession of sins, designated in the books of penance, began to be regarded as a universal duty, especially in Lent, or before partaking of the sacrament.

4). Augustine had always regarded *priestly absolution* as presumption, and it was not practiced in the first centuries of the middle ages, although for centuries it remained true that the *intercession* in distinction from absolution was the medium of reconciliation under the form of laying on of hands. As early as 452 Leo the Great had written that the assistance of the divine goodness was "so arranged that the indulgence of God was not to be obtained except by the *intercessions* of the priest; for, the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, had delivered power into the hands of those placed over the church so that they might give the act of penance to those confessing, and might restore them when purged by wholesome satisfaction to the communion of the sacrament through the door of reconciliation; in which work the Savior Himself was ever present, nor was ever absent from those things which He had committed for observance to His servants in accordance with His words in *Matt. 28:20*," (*Ep. 108, 2*).

2. *The Perfecting of the Institution of Confession and Penance:—*

1). This development was brought to a consummation toward the end of our period by the pseudo-Augustinian document *On True and False Penitence*. Seven things are here worthy of note;—(1). Confession has to do with deadly sins only;—"There are certain venial offences which are daily absolved by the Lord's Prayer, but others *which are unto death* are absolved only by penance." (2). Penance is allowed to all baptized persons, and more than once; and it is necessary, for all commit deadly sins. (3). This penance consists at first in that truly repentant confession which makes the sins venial;—"Through confession that becomes venial which was criminal in effect." (4). The priest *gives* forgiveness;—"Our Lord does not say 'Whom ye think to bind and loose,' but 'Upon whom ye exercise the work of justice and mercy.'" (5). Private confession is insufficient only in the case of serious public offenses. (6). After confession there is to follow the performance of works of repentance, that is, penance in its strict sense. (7). Penance can be made up in purgatory, but repentance and confession can not.—Yet the declarative formula of absolution did not become the rule

until the 13th Century, although *Petrus Damiani* (†1072) even in this period had spoken of "The Sacrament of Penance."

2). *Indulgences and Commutations*;—The habit of making indulgent remission of a part of the imposed penance in the case of persons especially penitent, is almost as old in the church as the imposition of penance itself. It was on German soil that this forbearance first gave rise to indulgences by means of *commutation*. As early as in the 8th Century the custom arose of exchanging a severe penance for a lighter one,—the giving of alms, Psalm singing, pilgrimages. The penance books of the time not only allowed commutation but even vicarious performance, and a release of the penance by the payment of money. In the *Order of Penance of Pseudo-Beda*, about 800 A. D., stands the following permission,—“If one be not able to fast, and has wherewith he may redeem it, let him if he be rich give twenty soldi for seven; or if he be not able, let him give ten; or if very poor, three.”

From the *end* of the 9th Century commutation and the penance books were universally received, although earlier they had often been considered an abuse, and direct protests were expressed against these books—“whose errors are certain but whose authors are uncertain.” By the year 1000, it was no longer rare for a bishop to grant indulgences for the benefit of a church, good for days and even up to forty years, to all who made pilgrimages to it. October 15th, 1040, Benedict IX, granted *plenary* indulgence in behalf of the church of St. Victor in Marseilles.

V. Completion of the Doctrine of Transubstantiation.

This chapter may very well be concluded by the summing up of the final steps in the development of the mass, though this will carry us beyond the limits of our period. 1). *Berengar of Tours* (†1088), revived the opinion of Ratramnus. At the great fast-synod of Nicholas II, in 1059 he was compelled to recant and to accept a confession composed by cardinal Humbert;—“The bread and the wine which are placed upon the altar are, after the consecration, not only sacrament but even the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and are not only sensibly in the sacrament but also truly borne by the hands of the priest, and broken in the teeth of the faithful.” But before 1069 Berengar took up the defense of his condemned doctrines, and a lively literary discussion ensued. This controversy led to the church's approbation of the crude realistic formulas, and to a further scientific development of the transubstantiation doctrine.



2). *Lanfranc* (†1089), advanced beyond Radbert only in the one important step that even sinners partake of the true body and blood —“Even to sinners and those unworthily partaking is it the true body of Christ, and the true blood, but in essence not in saving efficacy.”

3). *Guitmund*, Archbishop of Aversa, who was a pupil of Lanfranc and a vigorous opponent of Berengar, had yet learned something from his adversary. In his transubstantiation doctrine he unites both the external and the internal conceptions,—“The bread and wine of the Lord’s table, not sensibly but intellectually, not by absumption but by assumption, not through the door of the flesh contrary to the Scriptures, but according to the Scriptures, are changed into the whole body and blood of Christ.” And from this conception he was prepared to take a further step;—“We believe that nothing is contained in the whole which is not in each separate part.” To Guitmund, then, the *signum* is the body and blood of Christ, and is received alike by worthy and unworthy; but that which they signify—the “unity of the body of the church,” the abiding in Christ—this is accomplished only in believers. Guitmund also made use of the categories *substantia* and *accidentia*; “The accidents [distinguishable properties] of the former essence . . without violation of the Lord’s body seem in some degree to be subject to corruption.”

4). It was reserved for *Anselm of Canterbury* (†1109), consistently to add to these ideas this final one;—“In the acceptance of the *blood* of Christ we accept the *whole* Christ, God and man, and in the acceptance of his *body* likewise the whole.” Although abstaining from the cup was disapproved by most theologians at this time, yet it was occasionally practiced at the beginning of the 12th Century.

The steps of development may be seen at a glance:—

Radbert:—“The bread and wine are changed internally by faith, into the *real* body and blood.”

Lanfranc:—“Even sinners partake of the true body and blood, but get no benefit.”

Guitmund:—“By faith there is a partaking of the whole body and blood of Christ, but unbelievers do not abide in Christ.”

Ratramnus:—“Within there is something precious, but not the *real* body and blood of the *historic* Christ.”

Berengar:—“The same as Ratramnus, condemned in 1050.

Anselm:—"By partaking of the *body* or the blood of Christ we partake of the *whole Christ*."

5). The use of the term "transubstantiation" for the change which takes place in the elements is found first in Hildebert, Archbishop of Tours (†1134), who used the expression incidentally in a sermon, which would indicate that it was already in use;—"When I use the words of the canon and the word of transubstantiation, and my mouth is full of contradiction . . . although I honor Him with my lips, yet do I spit in the face of my Savior."

CHAPTER IV.

THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE NEW PIETY—to the time of the highest development of the Middle Ages, about 1300 A. D.

I. General Survey.

Three elements more or less related were active in the middle ages. 1). *Philosophy*:—In the 9th Century, by means of the translation of Porphyry's Introduction to the Logical Writings of Aristotle, scholastic science became interested in the three-fold question,—first, whether the concepts of species exist really apart from sense-perceived objects, as in so-called Platonic realism,—*universalia ante rem*; or, second, whether these concepts only have existence in objects, as in so-called Aristotelian realism,—*universalia in re*; or third, whether these concepts are only abstractions of our thought, as in the view of the Nominalists,—*universalia post rem*. Scholastic tradition was prevailingly realistic until within the 14th Century. Roscellin, who was the best known representative of the older nominalism, threw discredit upon nominalism and was condemned at Soissons in 1092, for teaching a tritheistic doctrine of the Trinity. His opponent, Anselm, declared that "dialectic heretics who hold that there are no universal substances except in the sound of the voice are incapable of understanding the mysteries of Christian faith. (Read Weber, *Hist. Philos.* pp. 219–222)

2.) *The New Scientific,—the Scholastic,—Theology*:—A theological science which had mastered formal philosophy since about the end of the 10th Century, sought to make itself fruitful in an understanding and justifying of church doctrines. Philosophy had been standing apart from the tradition of the church. In the middle



ages philosophic culture was limited to a formalistic working over of dogmas, and the coming to a conception of the world by means of numerous compromises between church tradition and philosophic study. "Scholasticism" was the name given to that science which sought, by scholastic formalism, to remove the actual difficulties standing in the way of belief before scientific investigation, and to prove that the necessary compromises between reason and authority were reasonable. Theological productiveness, however, did not die out until after the scholastic method had become dominant.

3.) *The New Piety*:—A new piety, with its mystic elements and with a new subjective warmth, sought in a realistic way to attain to the ideals of Christianity so far as these were understood by it. Here belong such reform purposes as those of Cluny, and the new monastic orders. Although this piety itself contained much that was new, it was yet thoroughly traditional and pre-disposed to believe on authority. As a result it was not without a hard struggle with this piety and with the traditionalism of the ordinary stamp that the new theology was able to make its way; and it did not do it without being influenced from that side.

II. Anselm. (†1109).

1.) *As a Dialectician*:—Anselm is one of the most important of the middle age theologians, and is himself a proof that the middle age theology was not designed from the beginning to be an unproductive and formal working-over of received dogmas, or given to mere clarifying criticism. Anselm did two things: (1). He emphasized belief in authority, often in a true churchly fashion;—"I do not ask to understand in order that I may believe, but to believe in order that I may understand," (*Proslog.* 1, 1). "If it is possible for the Christian to understand he returns thanks to God; if it is impossible, he does not toss his horns—but bows his head reverently." (2). But over against this belief upon authority he sets up as the aim of the new dialectic theology "to understand as far as possible all those things which catholic faith gives us to believe concerning Christ." His theologizing is often a mere seeking to solve questions by reasoning. His two little books, *Monologium* and *Proslogium*, in which he argues upon and seeks to demonstrate the being of God, and his *Cur Deus Homo*, are attempts that, even in spite of their formalism, are full of genius, and aim to gather together all the church dogmas into one central idea.

(Read *Shedd* I. 179-181; *Neander* IV. 361-371, 440-443, 447 f.

Weber's *Hist. Philos.* 210-219; Translation of *Proslogium* in *Bib. Sac.* VIII. 529-553.).

2.) *Anselm's doctrine of Satisfaction* was an advance beyond Augustine in two particulars;—first, in the fact that he thought of sin as *guilt against God*; and second, in that he brought Augustine's modified catholic doctrine of grace into such a necessary connection with the work of Christ that God's grace and Christ's work, together with their results, are practically the same thing. In this Anselm brought grace nearer to compassion [*misericordia*], and prepared the way for the Reformation. Anselm's ideas had no doubt been aided by the previous doctrine of penance. Yet his theory of satisfaction as something wrought by Christ, for sinners, is new, and was a conscious setting aside (as had earlier been done by John of Damascus) of the popular conception of Christ's work as a bargain with the devil.

In answering the fundamental question, *Cur Deus homo?* Anselm argued that humanity by sin has robbed God of honor due him. Now no man is ignorant of the fact that all administration of justice is subject to law. It is not possible that God should lose his honor. It is therefore necessary that either satisfaction or punishment should follow. But punishment is not possible, for "it would not be suitable that what God had proposed concerning man should be utterly destroyed." Satisfaction, therefore, is necessary. But man cannot render this satisfaction;—(1). Because "he is not able to render God more honor than it is his duty to do," (1, 20). If this idea had been consistently carried out, it would have shaken the foundations of catholic thought; but Anselm uses it only as an occasional and indispensable *assisting* idea. (2). Even if man could perform more than his due he could not render to God a satisfaction corresponding to his sin, for that is something which is "greater than anything except God Himself. The whole world does not balance the least disobedience against God," (1, 21). (3). Therefore the *Deus homo*,—"for it were not possible for any one to render this satisfaction except God, nor *ought any* one to do it except man," (2, 6). Christ, as the *Deus homo*, has rendered this satisfaction;—"Of his own free will He endured death, not yielding up his life as an act of obedience [to God] but on account of his obedience in serving righteousness, in which he so bravely persevered that He met death because of it," (1, 9). He who considers this must confess that He of His own free will had given to God for His honor something "with which nothing could be compared

aside from God Himself, and something which was able to outweigh all the evil deserts of all men."

(Read *Shedd* II. 273-286; *Fisher*, 216-221; *Neander* IV. 498-501; *Ritschl, Hist. Doct. of Jus. and Recon.* pp. 22 ff.; 'Translation of *Cur Deus Homo* in *Bib. Sac.* XI. 729-776, XII. 53-83.)

III. Abelard. (†1142).

(Read *Neander* IV. 373-401, on Abelard's Life and Teaching.)

1). *As a Dialectician*;—In Abelard, who was the greatest dialectician of the 12th Century, we see the desire for knowledge beginning to turn against the belief in authority;—"He is light of heart who believes quickly." This rational Christianity, although superior to heathen philosophy, seemed to get along easily with it. In many of Abelard's pupils theology vanished in the art of discussing. Bishop Stephen of Tournay, toward the end of this century, complained that "the study of sacred learning amongst us is fallen into the production of confusion, because the pupils applaud only what is new, and the masters are anxious rather for glory than for instruction. They write new summaries and commentaries over theology, as though the little works of the early fathers were no longer sufficient. Contrary to sacred regulations, there is public discussion concerning incomprehensible deity; verbose flesh and blood disputes irreverently concerning the incarnation of the Word; the indivisible Trinity is torn and rent into shreds, and there are as many errors as doctors." Yet the dialectic tendency continued gaining ground among theologians and furthered the pursuit of science. It also had its part in the founding of the oldest universities,—Paris, Oxford, etc.

Abelard's *Introduction* called out the defenders of orthodoxy against the new science, as we shall see in the case of Bernard. In his *sic et non* Abelard had sought to break down the authority of antiquity by calmly arraying the fathers against themselves. Even up to the end of this century other important representatives of the new theology besides Abelard stood in discredit by many in the circle of the pious;—Peter Lombard (†1160), Gilbert Porretans (†1154), Peter Pictavens (†1209), and others in France; Folmar von Tiefenstein (†1181), and others in Germany.

(Read *Fisher*, 221-228).

2). *His doctrine of Reconciliation*;—Instead of the satisfaction doctrine, as propounded by Anselm, Aberlard preferred the reconciliation ideas springing from Augustine;—"Through the revela-

tion of the love of God in the death of Christ love is awakened in us, which makes us into children of God; and God, for the sake of the merit of Christ which he won through his perfect fulfilling of the law, allowed the imperfect righteousness of the members of Christ to pass." As Neander says, Abelard looked upon the incarnation and passion of the Son of God as simply a manifestation of the divine love, and he referred everything to the subjective impression wrought upon the minds of men by this love. "Why might not God by an act of will alone forgive men their sins? What need was there, in order to this, of the sufferings of Christ? Christ had in fact already, before his passion, forgiven many their sins. Why might not God, by virtue of the same grace, forgive the rest of mankind their sins?"

Redemption in Abelard's thought is therefore not something objectively wrought for man, but it is something to be brought to pass in him;—"Redemption is that greatest love enkindled in us by Christ's passion." "Every person becomes more just, that is, more full of love to God, after the sufferings of Christ than before them, because every one is more inflamed with love by benefits conferred than by those hoped for." "The amazing grace shown us by God, who gave His own Son to become man and suffer for us, must enkindle in us such love in return as to make us ready to endure all suffering for His sake."

(Read *Neander* IV. 501-505; *Ritschl* I. trans. pp. 22-40; *Ueberweg*, *Hist. Philos.* I. 386-396).

IV. The New Piety and Mysticism.

Although this piety came from old roots, yet there are many things new;—the passionateness of Asceticism as seen in the scourging penance recommended by Peter Domiani (†1075); the fanatical worship of Love in the veneration of Mary—the *Ava Maria* sprang out of this time; the enthusiasm for the crusades; the further building out of the mysticism of the earlier churchly monkish piety established in the West from the influence of Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Erigena. The intensity of the subjective piety is a further religious development of catholicism not without significance for the history of doctrine. Especially will this be seen in the new mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux, chiefly in his eighty-six sermons in *Cantica Canticorum*, tracts on the Loving of God, and his five books, *de Consideratione ad Eugenium*.

1.) The influence of the School of St. Victor in Paris was on the whole not favorable to the developing philosophy. *William of Champeau* (†1121), the founder of the school, was a realist, and



opposed by his pupil, Abelard. *Hugo St. Victor* (†1140), and his disciple, *Richard St. Victor* (†1173), are the best known members of the school, and their piety is more or less mystical. Hugo may be thought of as in juxtaposition to such a dialectician as Abelard, or even as Anselm. His spirit is so suggestive of Augustine that he has been called "the second Augustine." He would discourage those who are curious to inquire into the wonderful revelations of God's almighty power, rather than to give themselves to the loving contemplation of the revelation of His divine compassion in the Scriptures. The real end in searching into the depths of the divine mysteries is that we ourselves should be stirred with a deeper love, and be able in this way to give an intelligent reason for the hope that is in us;—"The pure heart daily makes progress through its experiences of a daily intercourse with God, and it attains thereby to such a certainty as to begin already to have God present by contemplation; so that in no way, even though a whole world full of miracles should interfere, could it be drawn away again from its faith in Him and its love for Him." "Out of reason are necessary things, in accordance with reason are probable things, above reason are wonderful things, contrary to reason are incredible things. The two extremes do not require faith at all. What are according to reason and what are above reason—these require faith, (*de Sac.* 1, 3). Only the mystical vision can give authoritative certainty of the objects of faith belonging to the second class. While there was therefore a large mingling of philosophy and theology allowable, pertaining to things within the limits of reason, yet with regard to the supra-rational articles of faith, science was obliged to limit itself more than ever, because all that science could do was to show that these articles were not *against reason*, and to determine their systematic place within the comprehensive view of philosophic theology. (Read *Neander* IV 400-407, 411-414, *Weber* 222-234).

2). *Bernard of Clairvaux* (†1153), is the best known representative of the new mystical piety. Much of his mysticism however is but a renewal of old ideas, as for example, when he affirms that only those who have kissed the feet of the Lord in penitence and His leading hand in daily sanctification, can be admitted to the kiss on the mouth of the bridegroom; or when he designates this third "most sweet but secret kiss" as a "spiritual union" comparable with carnal matrimony, by which the soul becomes *one* spirit with the Son of God; or distinguishes this spiritual love in connection with II *Cor.* 5:16, from the love of the blood of Christ, and describes the height of spiritual love as a condition of rare blessed

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ecstasy. We perceive the old Augustinian foundation when Bernard distinguishes the ointment of contrition applied to the feet of Christ, from the ointment of devotion applied to his head from which we are to discern his divinity. But Bernard did not hold fast to these distinctions. His piety had pre-eminently to do with those ideas of Augustine which centered upon the historic Christ. His *devotio* is chiefly directed to Christ's humility and lowliness, His sufferings and His cross. The historic Christ is the gracious and *therefore* most lovely friend and bridegroom of the soul. Even for the portrayals of ecstasy the picture of the human lowliness of Jesus is very often chosen. It is not a rare thing to find that the forgiveness of sins springing out of the compassion [*misericordia*] of Jesus appears as the blessed experience of Jesus' love;—"There is a spot where truly God is perceived soothing and reposeful,—not at all the place of justice, nor of the Master—but of the Spouse. . . It furnishes me for all righteousness to have Him gracious, against whom alone I have sinned, for not to sin is God's righteousness, but man's righteousness is the indulgence of God," (*Cant.* 23, 5).

Bernard, in giving this turn to mystic contemplation Christianized mysticism and brought it into the church. He also gives fine scope on Catholic soil for the deepest thoughts of true Christian self-judgment;—"This is the whole merit of man—to place his whole hope on Him who saves all mankind." "I have sinned a great sin, my conscience is troubled,—yet is it not troubled, for I remember the wounds of the Lord." Bernard occasionally gives a correct expression to the Pauline idea of justification by faith;—"Wherefore whoever being troubled by sin longs for righteousness let him believe on Him who justified the unrighteous, and being justified by faith alone he shall have peace with God," (*Cant.* 22, 7).

Although the mysticism of Bernard marks religious progress the effects of the revival of the old mysticism were not entirely wholesome; for when once established it often led into a pantheism which became indifferent to the church,—as in the case of *Amalric of Bena* who was condemned in 1215 by Innocent III; and the sect of the Free Spirit.

(Read *Neander* IV 252-264, 503-505; *Ritschl* I, 93-101).

2). The founding of the *Franciscan and Dominican Orders* under the ideals of poverty and preaching gave prominence to the practical nature of Catholic piety in the 13th Century. *St. Francis* (†1226) would not only reproduce the ethical life but also the pov-

erty of Jesus; and Dominic adopted the Franciscan rule of poverty. It is worthy of note as Professor Fisher remarks, that while with most of the Scholastics the divinity in Christ tended to eclipse His humanity, there should have prevailed to such an extent a loving contemplation of His human traits and experiences; the love of Christ was a glowing, absorbing passion. To dwell on His humility, His self-denial, His death on the cross, was the main source of comfort and inspiration. St. Francis not only refers everything in his life to the mercy and goodness of God, but speaks of himself as sinful and worthless without these.

(Read *Neander* IV 268-279, *Ritschl* I. 101-104).

V. The Perfected Scientific Theology.

1. *The harmonizing of Philosophy and Piety*.—The transition from the conflict of scholasticism and piety was aided by a number of noted men. It was not however until the third decade of the 13th Century that the mistrust began perceptibly to disappear and the sphere of theological philosophy to broaden almost universally under Aristotelian influence. After more than a thousand years of development the blending of ancient philosophy and the Christian tradition came to their final expression in the scholastic system. The decisive factor in bringing this system to its perfection and giving it that position in the church which it retains to the present time was that the mendicant friars who were its adherents were in those very circles in which the new piety had received its most powerful stamp.—Alexander of Hales (†1245), Albertus Magnus (†1280), Bonaventura (†1274), Thomas Aquinas (†1274), and Duns Scotus (†1308). In this scholasticism of the 13th Century the lines of development springing from Anselm and from Bernard are seen running together, the mystic elements coming forth in varying strength, being stronger in Bonaventura than in the others. The transition to this second stage of the scholastic development was made by *Alexander of Hales*, who emphasized the fact that while in the other sciences scientific knowledge precedes conviction the reverse holds true in matters of religion. The work performed by *Peter Lombard* (†1160), did not really come to its fruition until in this century. His *Four Books of Sentences* taken from the fathers, particularly from Augustine and Gregory the Great, were helpful in harmonizing both the churchly circles and those who desired to exercise their dialectic ability.

(Read *Neander* IV. 409, 427-429; *Shedd* II. 286-304, especially 214 f. on the method of reasoning).

2. *The Method and Doctrine of Aquinas* (†1274);—The doctrine



of Thomas must not be confounded with that of the church of his day. It became the doctrine of an Order in 1286. The Franciscan-Scotic school opposed the Dominican-Thomistic, and in the 14th Century both of these were opposed by Nominalism, which found supporters in both Orders. The doctrine of Thomas is nevertheless of special significance for the history of doctrine because in his *Summa Theologiae* scholasticism reached its highest development, and his theology has permanently influenced the later form of catholic church doctrine both in details and in general character.

1). *His scholasticism*:—Formalism reached a terrible completeness in the method of Thomas. In the 518 questions of the *Summa* every one of the 2652 articles is treated under the same logical form. Yet underneath the formalism there is a theological and philosophical comprehensive view, even though not a perfectly uniform one,—a combination of church doctrine with Aristotelian philosophy, intermingled with Areopagitic influences.

2). *His conception of God and Causality*:—"The chief aim of sacred doctrine is to impart the knowledge of God." The *Summa* begins with the doctrine concerning God, and particularly discusses God's being, then the Trinity, and finally God's relation to the world. In this discussion he mingles Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic conceptions. It is Aristotelian when God is designated as the First Cause, the Pure Actuality, the Thinking Itself. But with this is combined the Neo-Platonic idea that God is to be thought of as the most *perfect* Being. Thomas strongly emphasizes the causality of God in second causes; and divine Providence appears almost as fatality. But it must be noted that Thomas says,—“In the case of natural causes, God by moving them does not prevent their actions from being natural.” And he has a genuine interest in human freedom, for “if the will is so influentially moved by another that it is not at all moved by itself, the works of the will could not be considered as works of merit or demerit.” Yet as a matter of fact Thomas speaks deterministically in saying,—“When the will is moved it is moved by itself, that is, by an intrinsic principle; but this intrinsic principle can be moved by another extrinsic principle [God], and so, being moved by itself is not repugnant to the fact that it is moved by another.” This philosophical determinism of Thomas is lucidly expounded by Professor Seth (*Enc. Brit.* XXI, 429). Voluntary action is that which originates in itself—in an internal principle. With animals the instinct of the moment *immediately* determines them to their

ends. Man determines his own course of action freely after a process of rational comparison. Nothing however is said about an *absolute* freedom of the will. Instead of this the will is subordinated to the reason in so far as it is supposed to *choose* what reason pronounces good or desirable. It is in this sense that the Thomistic doctrine is regarded as a moderate determinism. In opposition to Thomas, Scotus later advanced the extremest kind of *indeterminism*. The will can determine itself without motive in either of two opposite directions. Thomas said the divine will itself is determined by the ethical. Scotus affirmed that the good is itself only good by divine imposition. It is of great import to the history of doctrine that Thomas combines this philosophical determinism with the Augustinian predestination tradition. Predestination and reprobation become to Thomas merely special forms of divine Providence, that is, everything that happens is conditioned by God, who is the beginning and the end of all things;—"As predestination is a part of the providence of God with respect to those who are divinely ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of Providence with respect to those who finally fall away. . . For as predestination includes the *willingness* [*Voluntatem*] to *bestow grace and glory*, so reprobation includes the *willingness to permit* one to fall into guilt and to incur eternal punishment."

3). *His conception of sin, grace and merit*:—In the second part of the *Summa* Thomas treats of man's outreaching toward God,—the "eternal vision" and the "enjoyment of God," and particularly the acts in which this outreaching is realized, (1) he treats of the doctrines of sin and of law, and (2) of the virtues, which made such an epoch in the history of doctrine,—the three theological virtues, faith, love and hope; and the four cardinal virtues, prudence, justice [*Justitia*], fortitude and temperance.

In the treatment of the doctrines of *sin and grace*, Thomas marks the turning point after which the Semi-Pelagian views found clear expression also in the Scientific theology. On the whole even the pre-Thomistic theology varies considerably from that of Augustine. The distinguishing characteristic of Augustine's doctrine of grace was not brought down, but two of his ideas are much more strongly emphasized than had been done by himself;—(1) the idea of the permanency of the free will, in so far as this was understood to be the *ability to will freely*; (2) the conception that if man is to be saved he must *win merits*. Thus Peter Lombard says,—"From necessity the will is equally free both before and after sinning. For as it cannot be *compelled* then, so it cannot now. . . Where there is

necessity there is not liberty; where there is not liberty there is not will—nor therefore merit,”—which are Augustinian formulas and Gregorian ideas.

The real Augustinian formulas had more validity with Thomas because they were united with deterministic ideas. Thus Thomas himself really lost the conception of merit;—“It is evident that between God and man there is the greatest inequality, for they are infinitely separated, and everything that is in man is from God; hence there can be no merit of man with God except on the presupposition of divine ordination.” Nevertheless Thomas accepts the conception of merit and helps himself by the following distinction;—“An act of human merit may be considered in two ways,—according to what proceeds from the free will, and according to what proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit.—If it be according to the content of the act itself and that which proceeds from the free will then *there* is no worthiness because of the great inequality [between God and man], but there is a congruity by a certain equality of proportion [in comparison with man’s own condition]; for it seems suitable that to a man acting in accordance with his own virtue, God should give a recompense in proportion to the excellency of that virtue. But if we speak of a meritorious work in respect to that which proceeds from *the grace of the Holy Spirit* then it is properly deserving of eternal life.” It will be seen that these ideas of Thomas are ambiguous. They may be understood in the sense of a deterministically modified Augustinianism, or in the sense of a Semi-Pelagian doctrine of freedom. And for this very reason Thomas’s doctrine became the turning point for further development. After this it was no longer a question between the Augustinian and the Semi-Pelagian doctrine of freedom, but between determinism and freedom.

4). *As to the doctrine of Redemption*;—That the church of the middle ages at the time of its highest development had no real dogma as to the work of Christ, is shown by Thomas’s expressions in the *Summa*. In treating of the work of Christ he makes use of all the conceptions offered by tradition, with the exception of that of a legal transaction with the devil. He considered our salvation as wrought by Christ;—(1). By way of merit, “inasmuch as Christ throughout His life from His conception merited both for Himself and for us;” (2). By way of satisfaction; (3). By way of sacrifice; (4). By way of redemption; (5). In apparent deviation from Anselm’s conception he designates the satisfaction which Christ has furnished, as a receiving of the penalties



of sin. (6). He speaks, finally, of a reconciliation with God brought about by Christ's death—"a reconciliation," and "a placating of God's wrath." It is evident from what we see in Thomas that the one idea lying at the foundation of all the above named conceptions, had become dominant in the church—the theory of Anselm.

In individual points, it is true, Thomas differs from Anselm;—human sin has only "a certain infinity;" the incarnation and the expiatory sufferings of Christ are not absolutely necessary "for since God has no higher" He might have pardoned without satisfaction; "but it was more suitable that we should be redeemed by the passion of Christ than by the will of God alone."—Yet the thought is common to Thomas and Anselm—and it is the idea which governs the following period—that Christ has done for us that which we are accustomed to do in the third part of penance, viz. has rendered satisfaction.

5). *His doctrine of Justification*.:—The result of the work of Christ is with both Thomas and Anselm a double one;—"It has not only freed man from sin but it has also merited for him justifying grace and the glory of blessedness." According to Thomas four things belong to justification. (1). The infusing of grace. (2). The motion of the free will toward God—here is the place for the action of faith. (3). The motion of the free will against sin. (4). The remission of guilt. And according to Thomas these four acts occur at the same time, "for the justification of the sinner is wrought by God at once, not successively." This faith which is the condition of all that follows, and this first infusion of grace which brings with it remission can *not*, according to Thomas and most of the ancients, *be deserved*. The grace of remission is with Thomas as it was with Augustine, less prominent than the "grace of inspiration," faith is less prominent than love.

6). *The Sacraments*.:—In Augustine a chasm had been left between the doctrine of grace and the conception of the church as the indispensable means of salvation. Scholasticism which was able to furnish the necessary connection between justifying grace and the work of Christ which had been wanting in Augustine, bridged over this chasm also. Christ won grace for man, and imparts it to him *in the church by means of the sacraments*. In the doctrine of the sacraments lies the special significance of scholasticism for the history of doctrine. With reference to the main facts however, Thomas is hardly more than a systematizer of tradition. The

number of the sacraments had been settled only after long hesitation. The *seven* arose from a combination of two previous enumerations and appears as early as 1140, and also in Peter Lombard. They are Baptism, Confirmation, The Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Ordination, Marriage,

As to the way in which the sacraments mediate grace opinions still varied up to the time of Thomas. Hugo St. Victor had taught that "God is the Physician, man the patient, and the sacrament the *vase*." Bonaventura rejected this as being "only medicine in its box," and explained the effective working of the sacrament by virtue of a pre-established harmony between the divine working and the churchly performance;—"The effectiveness of the sacraments is a certain efficacious ordaining for the receiving of grace in accordance with a divine compact." Thomas stands between the two, regarding the sacraments as the "instrumental causes of Him who imparts the grace by means of them." All agreed that the sacraments had received an effectiveness from God not primarily conditioned on faith. This conviction found expression about the end of the 12th Century in the effectiveness ascribed to the sacraments *ex opere operato*. As to the sacraments of the old law Thomas declares that they have efficacy only through faith—"but it is otherwise with the sacraments of the new law which confer grace *ex opere operato*. At the beginning it was not intended by this formula to deny that the real saving efficacy of the New Testament sacraments was dependent on the disposition of the recipient. On the contrary this was expressly asserted even by Thomas,—“He who has not faith is regarded as false and does not receive the essence of the sacrament.” But the formula was set in operation which in the course of time necessarily reduced this demand for subjective worth to the minimum.

As to the Lord's Supper up to the time of Thomas and including Thomas, scholasticism contributed to a more exact development of the idea of concomitance, and furnished more careful discussions as to the presence of Christ in the encharist *extra usum*. Thomas was the first who really attempted to solve the problem by finding out a kind of presence which while "all in all and all in every part" was yet "undimensive." *Indulgences* were justified by a reference to the treasury of merits or of works of supererogation, which Christ and the saints had won. Yet the value of the indulgences to the dead in purgatory is only indirectly and by no means universally admitted;—"To the dead indulgences cannot be of di-




rect value, but they may be of advantage secondarily and indirectly." The beneficial effect of *extreme unction* was not stated to be primarily the possible bodily recovery, but the remission of venial sins, and also of mortal sins when necessary.

As to the sacrament of *ordination* there was still division on the question as to what was here the *form* and what the *essence* of the sacrament. They found still more difficulty in answering this question in the sacrament of *marriage* which "because it has least of the spiritual, is put last among the sacraments." The assertion that this sacrament is necessary because "by propagation it preserves the number of the church," is in striking contrast to the high honor given to virginity. This contrast confirms the fact that casual circumstances—*Eph.* 5:32—played a part in the origin of this sacrament.

(Read *Shedd* II. 304-317; *Neander* IV. 511 f, 518-528; *Fisher* 231-262; *Ritschl* I. 41-59, 73-81; *Weber* 241-246; *Ueberweg* I. 440-452).

3. *The significance of Duns Scotus* (†1308):—His criticism of the Thomistic doctrine prepared the way for the breaking down of scholasticism. Faith and knowledge are more widely separated in his criticism than they were in Thomas. We therefore find him resting his faith firmly on the *authority* of revelation and of the church, while he is equally skeptical as to the reasoning used to support these doctrines. Theology is practical knowledge, but it is not science in a strict sense. His doctrine of God and his anthropology were specially influential in the history of doctrine, in both of which he opposes the determinism and the intellectualism of Thomas.—"God above all is a Being who consciously wills, whose will is bound by no law, and is restrained by no limits to His Omnipotence." Man's will is also determined neither by the objects nor by the intellect; it is rather itself the final cause of its volition, —a view which became significant in the criticism of certain doctrines. We find him grounding the special nature of redemptive works and the sufficiency of Christ's merit purely on the fact that God so willed; and he explains merit in general as only a matter of divine acceptance. God, because of His "absolute power" could allow satisfaction made even by man himself to suffice; He could let that which man is able to do in his own power pass as *merita de congruo*. But in accordance with His ordaining power, He has willed that men can only be acceptable in His sight by means of the garment of imparted grace, by means of love.



God's ordained way for the impartation of grace is through the sacraments, and here again the common catholic perversion of grace celebrated a triumph. Through the sacraments grace is given to all who do not positively oppose it. Instead of the "contrition" in the sacrament of penance, all that is required is "attrition,"—a sorrow for sin arising from shame or fear of punishment,—and this can be rendered without grace. In this thought the very advantage of the sacrament of penance is that it can bestow forgiveness even on the one who does not experience true contrition. The contrast however between Thomism and Scotism was not a contrast between orthodoxy and heresy, but between school and school. This diversity of schools has not advanced, but limited, the development of dogma in catholicism.

(Read *Shedd* II. 315-317; *Fisher* 232, 272; *Dorner; Hist. Prot. Theol.* I. 38; *Weber* 240-252; *Ueberweg* 452-457).


CHAPTER V.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRISIS IN THE ROMAN CATHOLICISM OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1300-1500 A. D.)

I. General Survey.

A richer life became apparent in the catholicism of the last two centuries of the middle ages. Even dogmatically considered this was not a period of decay. This development however led up to a crisis. Scholasticism lived on, but without credit. Alongside of the newly strengthened papacy there had also remained an anti-papal tendency in the church. Mysticism, in spite of its good catholic character, was more and more pushing dogmas and the hierarchical "Institution of Salvation" into the background. And the hierarchy was no longer able to maintain itself as before against the reformatory and national-churchly tendencies. The differing forces and elements of power in catholicism had lost their harmony. This crisis had reached its height when the Renaissance and Humanism made a deep cleft between the culture of the time and the traditions of the church, and then in its further development showed how a regeneration of catholicism might be possible.

The degeneration of the papacy was also of doctrinal significance. It was a doctrinal reaction which led the *Episeopalisti* to take up the ethical-religious side of Augustine's conception of the



church, and affirm that the church was primarily "the totality of the members of Christ," and that in this church and its faith every man may be saved even though no pope could be found in the whole world, [*Dietrich of Niem* in Council of Constance]. The superiority of the ecumenical council over the pope was set forth in the councils as a dogma, from the time of the Council of Constance (1414). But although the infallibility of the ecumenical council became good catholic doctrine, it was not unquestioningly accepted in the West. And before the end of the middle ages the papacy sought to undo the work of this reaction. *Pius II* in the bull *execrabilis* of January 23, 1460, condemned appeals to a general council. And the Fifth Lateran Council in 1516, by the bull *Pastor eternus* restored the curialistic belief in the pope whom it asserted "is possessed of sole authority above all councils." The bull *Unam sanctam* was also renewed. Yet even in the 16th Century the traditions of Constance and Basel were not wholly forgotten.

II. The Going Out of Scholasticism.

Middle age scholasticism degenerated for two reasons; (1). Having recognized the impossibility of reaching its ideal, and yet being unable to lay new foundations for theology, it withdrew wholly to the principle of authority. (2). The necessity for giving attention to what was reasonable having been removed it began to expend its acumen on the most trivial questions.

(Read *Weber* 252-261, *Dorner Doct. Person of Christ*, Div. II., Vol. I, 370-377.

III. The Coming in of Nominalism.

1). Even Duns Scotus who was a realist had prepared the way for a change in scholasticism. This change was carried much farther by nominalism, which arose again soon after his death. *Durandus* (†1334), was its advocate in the Dominican order, *William of Occam* (†1347), among the Minorites. It soon drove genuine Thomism and Scotism into the background and came to rule scientific theology. Even most of the advocates of reform in the 15th Century, —D'Ailly, Clemanges, Gerson,—were nominalists. Nominalism not only made a fundamental distinction between the most important truths of faith and of reason but it even precluded the possibility of supplemental proofs of the reasonableness of the dogmas. The authority of revelation and of the church was emphasized with a vigor which seems almost like irony. Occam even declared that the doctrine of the church, without any loss to its authority might

have been much more irrational than it is, because God in accordance with his absolute power might have acted very differently from what He has done.

2). In *Gabriel Biel* (†1495), nominalistic scholasticism finally came to conceptions which were much farther removed from Augustinian ideas than Semi-Pelagianism. What Thomas had only casually ascribed to natural powers in their original condition was now affirmed of the *purely natural* condition of all men. The moral virtues can be developed without grace; and even the theological virtues, including love to God, may be naturally acquired. Although only "infused virtues" are pleasing to God, yet human action previous to grace is not a matter of indifference to Him. If man does what lies in his power he *deserves de congruo* the grace which makes it possible for him to gain his salvation through the *merita de condigno*.

3). In *the doctrine of the sacraments*, the more magical conception had the last word. Biel says,—“The sacrament is said to confer grace *ex opere operato* so that of itself . . . unless the obstacle of mortal sin prevents, grace is conferred upon those who *partake*, in such a way that beyond the exhibition of the outward sign, no good disposition within is required in him who receives.” This, as Tschackert observes, was the concluding point in the development of the church into an external sacramental institution. As to the magical realism in the mass Biel even went so far as to say,—“He who created me, if it is right to say it, has granted it to me to create Him; and He who created me without myself, is created by my mediation. This stupendous dignity of the priesthood Scripture cannot sufficiently express by one name,—it calls them now kings, now angels, now gods.” Nominalism, both in the case of Occam and Biel, was led by means of the question as to the manner of the presence of Christ's body in the Lord's Supper, into discussions concerning the relation of Christ's body to space. This is one of the questions which took on importance in the following period. The conception of the presence of the body of Christ apart from quantity, in particular places, which Occam and Biel together with some of their predecessors made use of to explain the real presence in the sacrament, approaches the conception of the spaceless divine omnipresence. Although these conceptions had at this time no further influence on Christology yet it is worthy of remark that Occam, considering as he did the ubiquity of Christ's body and a union of it with another body in the same space as not

at all unthinkable, was inclined to the conception of a co-existence of the sacramental bread and the body of Christ, as simpler than that of the remaining of the accidents only—a view which was absurd to nominalistic thought. Yet church authority decided him for the latter view. Nominalistic scholasticism separated knowledge and faith, and sailed rudderless into the more and more troubled stream of tradition.

IV. Mysticism and Mystic Piety.

(Read *Ueberweg* I, 467-484; *Dorner Hist. Prot. The.* 20-63; *Doct. Person of Christ* Div. II, Vol. II, 3-29; *Neander* V, 280-412; *Ullmann Reformers etc.*, Vol. II; *Theologia Germanica*, Trans.)

1. *The so-called German Mysticism*; 1). The German, or more properly the Dominican Mysticism differs essentially from that of Bernard. Its special feature is that individual ideas of the Thomistic doctrine are expounded in a mystic sense, and in part are even speculatively developed. In so far as it took on itself the task of practical edification it was compelled to choose out and even to remold what it taught with special reference to its edifying effect. And in so far as this aim was *consciously* maintained it may be considered reformative.

2). The first of these theologians to make their science practically fruitful were John of Sterngasse in Strasburg, Dietrich of Freiburg (end of 13th Century) and Master Eckhart (†1329), a teacher in Strasburg and Cologne. In their Latin writings they set hardly any limit to their scholastic science, but in their German sermons and tracts they make prominent such of their scientific ideas as could be brought into speculative connection with the mystically edifying. Speculations concerning the nature of God, the Trinity, divine Ideas, the divine Word, the relation of God to the world and human knowledge, had a special interest for them because these ideas could be combined with the mystical conception of the innermost sanctuary of the soul, and with the mystical ideas of the birth of God in the righteous man. These are the distinctive elements in the speculative German mysticism.

3). *Eckhart* (†1329).—According to *Ueberweg* the mystical elements in this most noted of the German mystics, are his conception of the highest activity of the reason as immediate intellectual intuition; his denial of the separate being of all finite things; his demand that the individual self should be given up; and his doctrine of complete union with God as the supreme end of man. On some of these points a few extracts will be suggestive;—“*Esse ist*

Deus, and from Him everything is without mediation." "In God Himself all things are and are good, outside Him nothing is." "If now our knowing, our looking away from all mere distinctions [*hoc atque hoc*], concentrates itself upon God as the *commune esse*, then is the *verbum dei* born in the depths of the soul, for, cleaving unto God the soul by clinging conceives God, conceives good." This God-birth is the fundamental event of a truly Christian life,— "Hence it is that the external act, in so far as it is something else than what is conceived, adds nothing at all. Merit consists not in the number and magnitude of acts." In his German tract on the *Birth of the Eternal Word in the Soul*, Eckhart says;—"God speaks His Word in all creatures, but no being can perceive Him but reasonable beings alone." "In so far as man *denies himself* unto God and becomes united with God, in so far he is more God than creature. When man is once free from himself unto God and is no one else than God alone, he is really the same by grace that God is by nature, and God Himself recognizes no difference between Himself and this man." The whole Eckhart mysticism may be thought of as a conception of Thomistic and Augustinian tradition, from the point of view of the Areopagite.

4). In the circle of the theologians and laymen who were influenced by speculative mysticism, the scholastic and even the speculative ideas are completely overshadowed by the practical and the edifying;—Henry Suso †1366, John Tauler †1367, [John Ruysbroeck †1381], the Friends of God, and the author of *Theologia Germanica*. Yet the fundamental mystical ideas in Eckhart are clearly discernable even in the so-called *Theologia Germanica*, as the following ideas which can be found in various parts of the book will indicate:—"But when that which is perfect shall come (i. e. when it is known), that which is in part shall be done away (i. e. all that belongs to the creature, to the *ego*, to the selfhood, the *meum*). If I am not willing to suffer this, viz. that God alone do everything in me—but I wish to possess my own personality, as mine and I, me and for me, and the like, this hinders God. If one recognizes in truth that *the perfect alone* is all and over all, it follows of necessity that one must prefer the perfect to all good and it follows therefrom that one takes nothing to himself, neither being, nor knowing, nor doing, nor whatever one may call good. And thus one becomes poor and in himself nothing, and in Him and with Him all that is every created thing. Before all it is necessary that there be a true inward life, and then in truth God Himself be-



comes the man, so that there is nothing more there but what is God or of God." (Read chapters 1, 3, 43, 52, 53).

On the whole German mysticism shows a retrogression in comparison with Bernard. There is a stronger reviving of Neo-Platonism. Christ's historical life has hardly more than a figurative significance. The forgiveness of sins is only referred to once in the *Theologia Germanica*. Yet in this mysticism there was present a progressive element,—it *emphasized* the necessity of the new birth before all external works and before all dogmas. It taught "what is the old man and what is the new, what the child of Adam and what the child of God, and how Adam shall die and Christ arise in us." But new ideas leading out beyond the former understanding of Christianity the German mysticism did not possess. It was *Catholic* piety. The close relationship between mystic and monkish piety is evident even in Eckhart and Tauler.

2. *The later Franciscan Mysticism*;—In the *mystical writings of Franciscan origin* this relationship to monkish Catholic piety is still more evident than in the Dominican. For instance, in the *Book of Spiritual Poverty* the life of poverty is itself made the perfection of the following of Jesus, as is done by all of the "Spiritual Franciscans." In regard to the speculative features of these two kinds of mysticism Ritschl, who has been followed by Harnack, made a distinction between Dominican and Franciscan mysticism;—(1). In the Dominican the mystic union is thought of as mediated by knowledge;—(2). In the Franciscan—corresponding to Duns' doctrine of God—through the tranquillity of the will. (See *Ritschl* I, 103-108) But it is evident that a strict separation of these two groups cannot be carried out. Old and new lines of influence crossed each other often, as, for example, in the case of John Ruysbroeck, who was particularly stirred by Dominican mysticism. But in this diversity there remained a common characteristic;—practical piety left part of the dogmas unused at one side, without denying them. This is seen in the *Imitation of Christ*, which Loofs thinks was written between 1410 and 1420 but hardly by Thomas à Kempis. Here monkish Catholicism, touched particularly by mystic influences of Augustinian origin, has found its noblest expression.

V. The So-Called Pre-Reformers.

(Read *Neander* V, 150-157, 165-173; *Dorner Prot. The.* I, 63 80; *Fisher* 263-267; *Ritschl* I, 90 f, 108-115).

The way for the Reformation of the 16th Century was prepared not only negatively but positively in the middle ages. But the

development in consequence of which this Reformation is explicable was not brought about by the so-called Pre-Reformers alone (The Albigenses, The Waldenses, John Goch †1475; John Wesel †1482; John Wessel †1489; John Wyclif †1384; John Hus †1415; Savonarola †1498). The desire for reformation often found expression in the church of the middle ages. We cannot in a strict sense speak of "Fore-Runners" of the Reformation of the 16th Century except when ideas can be found which reach out beyond the Catholic understanding of christianity. The only two of the Pre-Reformers upon whom Loofs thinks this title can be conferred with considerable right are Wyclif and Hus. But as Hus is only "a conservative Wyclifite" the two are practically reducible to one. Even Wyclif's reform ideal up to the period 1377-78 Loofs considers to have been purely the ascetic Franciscan idea of church reform turned against the hierarchy. "It is not possible to excommunicate a man except he be excommunicated primarily by himself,"—by sin. The Holy Scripture is alone an unerring authority and from this it follows that "no pope except Christ is absolutely necessary to rule the holy church of God."

This anti-papal tendency was increased after 1377 by the attacks of the Episcopalists, and after 1378 by the papal Schism. The treatise *de ecclesia*, which was written at the end of 1378 is hardly affected by the Schism. The head of the church, it declares, is Christ alone; "The lord the pope, if he is predestinated and exercises his pastoral office, is head of so much of the church militant as he rules." At the same time indulgences are criticized—only God forgives; likewise canonization, and the manner then in vogue of worshipping saints, for that kind of self-glorifying and enriching *abuse* contradicts the law of Christ and the *divinum dominium*. How far the schism drove him is evident from the *Dialogus*. Wyclif now asserts that the papacy is a conception foreign to the Holy Scripture,—"The pope, it seems, is the vicar not of Christ but of anti-Christ." The madness [*vesania*] of Constantine out of which arises the "imperial clergy" ought to be made good again by the temporal power of the present. Indulgences and privileges were best done away with, for such "phantasms founded neither in reason nor in scripture" as well as those "offices which the bishops reserve for themselves,—confirmation of youth, ordination of the clergy and consecration of places—are all things which appeal to a desire either of temporal gain or glory." Reason and Scripture also lead already to doubts concerning the correctness of the doc-

trine of transubstantiation; and the conviction of the *sole authority of the Scripture*, now grown to be independent of the interpretation by tradition, led to the translation of the Bible. This is proved by the unpublished treatise *de veritate scripturae* of the year 1378.

But not until his thesis against the doctrine of transubstantiation in 1381 did Wyclif's polemics change from the realm of church politics to that of doctrine. The positive view which lay at the bottom of his attack was the symbolical conception of Augustine,—"Christ's body is in the bread not *substantialiter, corporealiter* and *dimensionaliter* as it is in heaven, but *virtualiter, spiritualiter, sacramentaliter*. Believe and thou hast eaten . . . because it must be understood of spiritual eating." One special step of progress, very characteristic for the nature of the reformatory ideas of Wyclif, viz.:—his opposition to the mendicant friars—brings Wyclif to the point of rejecting "every religion or sect humanly instituted which tends toward a division of the Christian religion," and of favoring "the common Christian religion, which is more sure, more easy, and better than the private." The ideas of Wyclif especially, helped to build up by the side of the papal church a purer catholic christianity which at the Reformation of the 16th Century greeted Luther's appearance with the most joyous hopes. [The Bohemian Brethren].

VI. The Renaissance and Humanism.

Another movement was much more dangerous to the Catholic church than the efforts of the Reform Councils and the so-called Pre-Reformers. It was classical antiquity, given new life by Italy's great poets,—*Dante* †1321, *Petrarch* †1374 and *Boccaccio* †1375,—and studied by its artists with enthusiasm since 1400 A. D. Before the glory of the dead now brought to life, all the beauty of the Christian present grew pale, and the most limitless Individualism, freed from the bonds of tradition, found pleasure in the most unreserved worship of ancient poetry, art and philosophy. Heathen culture, egoism, pleasure in the world, and too often coarse immorality, characterized the modern view. The majority of the popes from the time of *Nicholas V* (1447-1455), were followers of Maecenas rather than of Peter. *Leo X* (1513-1521), who condemned Luther and gave employment to Raphael and Michael Angelo, was a thoroughly renaissance pope. In Italy the church threatened to separate into a superstitious mass and an "enlightened" [rationalistic] clerical aristocracy.

Laurentius Valla †1447, contested the genuineness of the Gift of Constantine; of the Areopagitic writings; and also the Apostolic authorship of the Apostles' creed. By the study of Greek even before 1453, and by the interest in Hebrew the means were furnished for a future regeneration of the church, and the feeling for historical exegesis and historical criticism was awakened. Individual humanists even in Italy as early as the 15th Century,—Pico della Mirandula †1494—dreamed of a humanistic purification of Catholicism which they considered legitimate. From Italy humanism spread into all the West. The un-churchly and un-christian tendency of the earlier Italian humanism was less prominent outside of Italy. German patriotism often united the anti-Romish traditions of the 15th Century and Humanistic Enlightenment,—Ulrich von Hutton †1523. Yet here the humanistic culture pressed even into the church circle, whose piety being mainly mystical, continued to hold fast the faith of the church. As Pico and others of the younger Italian humanists had dreamed of a humanistic regeneration of churchly Christianity, so also [Ximenes †1517], Colet †1519, More †1535 and especially Erasmus †1536, cherished ideas of reform which, without wishing to touch the *old* foundation of doctrine, looked toward a removal of abuses of later origin, toward the nurture of a humanistically ennobled church science, and toward a *moral* reformation of the church and an ethical application to its dogmas. But before these ideas could be carried out a new element entered into the development of the history of dogma in the beginning of the Reform Movement at Wittenberg.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOSPEL IN PROTESTANTISM, AND THE PARTIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINES.

I. The Religious Understanding of the Gospel and the Dogmatic Tradition of Martin Luther.

(Read *Koestlin, Theology of Luther* 2 vols.; *Schaff* Vol. VI; *Creeds, Etc.*, Vols. I. and III; *Fisher, Hist. Ref.* 80-103, *Hist. Doct.* 121-146.)

1. *Luther's Development to 1515:—*1.) The Lutheran Reformation had its beginning in practical religious questions. It was after Luther's long and earnest monkish struggle for salvation in the Augustinian cloister at Erfurt, and after diligent study of the scholastics [the nominalistic Occam; D'Ailly; Biel; and possibly Gerson] that through Scripture and Augustinian teaching he found peace in the recognition of the fact,—“that the righteousness of God in *Romans* 1:17, was not a righteousness by which God was just, and punished ungodly sinners,” but one “by which a merciful God justifies us through faith.”

2.) The early steps of development are seen best in his writings, beginning with 1513. His annotations, glosses and first *schola* upon the *Psalms* (1513-1515), show him in full harmony with the church and its monasticism. Yet Augustinian mysticism, and in part Bernard's piety, served to put much traditionalism into the background. Strictly speaking, Luther's views at this time were not mystical. In his case mystical conceptions were displaced by religious conceptions which later became the central elements of his piety. His view at this time is characterized more particularly by his placing over against each other such related conceptions as the following:—“That one should justify himself”—“God should justify;” “Some merit”—“Pure compassion;” “Law, Letter which killeth”—“Grace, spirit which maketh alive.” He speaks of the gospel law as working in two directions,—“It makes alive and slays, its judges as to the old man, a (vivifying) compassion going before in regard to the new man; justifying the second man . . . it crucifies the old man.”

3.) The new in the shell of these ideas, half in accord with the Catholic conception of the gospel, is that “vivifying,” “justifying,” is, with rare exceptions, recognized as in no wise different from “redeemed without merit,” “not to impute sin,” “to reckon

righteousness to any one." Also grace is identified with *misericordia*, with "grace in the forgiveness of sins." Faith appears to be a *confidence* in God's truth and in Christ's work for us. "Before obedience it is necessary that the person be acceptable." Faith is the direct way to the eternal good, in contrast to the roundabout way of the law. So that faith, for him, is subjective Christianity; "Make me living, make me believe,—*quia justus ex fide vivet, fides enim vita nostra est.*" From these fundamental religious conceptions Luther was already able to recognize a specific difference between the economy of *grace* and the legal retributive relations. Yet he had only scholastic [nominalistic] formulas with which to give expression to them,—“Faith and grace, by which we are to-day justified would not justify us of themselves, had not the covenant of God made it so.”

2. *Luther's Ideas to the End of 1516*:—1.) The early ideas of Luther were (after 1515) deepened by his work on the Epistle to the Romans, in connection with the University; by continued study of Augustine; and under the influence of German mysticism. (See his Preface to *Theologia Germanica*, written in 1516; and his praise of Tauler, in December, 1516). But even now Luther did not become a real mystic. With an ethical-religious turn of meaning the mystical conception of the nothingness of the natural man, and the necessity of self-denial, influenced his understanding of “what is the old man and what is the new.” The mode of expression certainly seems to be in partial agreement with mysticism;—“Let us know nothing, let us desire nothing, let us be nothing—this is the way of profit, the way of the cross by which we may most quickly attain to life, to which we can never attain by works.” These influences at first intensified the anti-worldly, monkish coloring of his ideas about mortification, and also indirectly intensified confidence in Christ;—“Behold, how sweet is the Lord, where before thou hast perceived how bitter is everything which we are.” “Thou hast thine own—Christ himself, through faith; let Him have His own, i. e., thee and works in thee, and there will be a perfect marriage.”

2.) Not later than the autumn of 1516, Luther dogmatized Augustine's ideas of the absolute inability of the natural man to good, along with the predestinarian consequences. In his disputation against scholastic theology, in September, 1517, he asserted,—“The election and predestination of God is eternal. On the part of man nothing but indisposition, even rebellion against grace, pre-

cedes grace." Pressing more deeply into Pauline thoughts, he learned to understand the nature of the gospel as contrasted with the law, in a sense different from that which he previously held,— "The gospel [*Matt.* 11:28 and 9:2] is a joyous and blessed message to the soul which was perishing through the law,—to hear that the law is fulfilled *through Christ*; that it is not necessary to fulfill it; but only through faith to cling to and conform unto Him who fulfills it, because Christ is our righteousness, sanctification and redemption."

3.) Yet Luther held fast that the gospel, in that it expounds the law, kills. He distinguished now a "first office of the gospel" and "a second and proper and true office." In spite of the view gained as to the abrogation of the law, he continued to hold throughout his life, that faith was the "inner righteousness." But now, as later, he was far from regarding this inner righteousness and the good works from it, as the real ground of our acceptance with God. God justifies in that *He gives* this righteousness of faith, not because it exists;—"The righteousness of faith is given apart from works, but yet it is given for the sake of works [*propter opera*], because no *living* thing can exist in idleness." And the works do not condition the righteousness, but *vice versa*;—"No working confers righteousness upon the righteous man, but through this [working] he serves God and man." "For therefore we are taught that we are first sanctified and prepared and cleansed, by contrition and penitence, before any good works, in order that we may be righteous before the works; for this cleansing is the work of God and the infusion of grace,—justification apart from ourselves." It is evident then that with Luther, regeneration, renewal, and sanctification were, like justification, primarily religious and not ethical ideas. The formulas are not new, but the ideas. With Augustine it is love that saves, even when he speaks of faith. Here it is faith which saves, even when love is mentioned. Luther at this time thought in thoroughly Augustinian formulas, but the new conception of faith gave them a new significance.

4.) By the end of 1516 we find in Luther the following, which remained his fundamental ideas of Christianity:—The righteousness of faith; law contrasted with gospel; unconditional divine grace and absolute inability of the natural man to good; the inner necessity of good works, and their end, purely as the service of [God and] one's neighbor, and not service for the winning of salvation.



These were practical religious conceptions, and not dogmatic doctrines. For this very reason they could often be clothed in old formulas not perfectly corresponding to them. Just this was the most important. Just this was the reformatory in Luther's ideas. Practical Christianity was to him not the acceptance of an authoritatively given *knowledge* of God and the world, and side by side with this the *ethical virtues*, but it was being rooted in *religious faith*, and it was only attainable through experience. In comparison with this confidence in God's grace the whole realm of ethics in the narrower sense fell into the background as that which is *conditioned* in comparison with that which *conditions*. That which was new in Lutheran Christianity was primarily this *religious understanding* of the gospel. Luther himself did not at first see that church custom, dogmatic tradition and the hierarchy made this religious understanding of Christianity difficult and almost impossible. That it was his duty to set aside these hindrances to right Christianity, Luther saw only gradually in his controversy with them. He had never desired to found a new church. The very faith of his childhood taught *credo unam ecclesiam catholicam*.

3. *The Critical Application of Luther's Religious Conceptions in the period following 1516:—1.)* From about the middle of 1516 Luther had become clear that the "Pelagianizing" later scholasticism [of Occam, Scotus, Biel] did not understand the gospel. As early as July, 1516, he emphasized in a sermon that indulgences, "even if they are the very merit of Christ and the saints, are yet a most abominable servant of avarice." He explained that even in accordance with the indulgence doctrine, they were nothing else than "the remission of enjoined penance; their effects in purgatory were limited to the penance enjoined by the pope." Apart from this he held at the very most only "an influence through the application of the intercessions of the whole church." In October, 1516, he recommended, instead of "fleeing from penance," "the seeking of crosses," "the inner penance," as "the business of the whole Christian life." In May, 1517, he noted that the theology of Wittenberg, being united with the Bible and Augustine, was in conflict with Aristotle, the authority of scholasticism.

2.) But it was the Thesis controversy which first brought this criticism out of its limits in Wittenberg and the academic life, into the life of the whole church. The fact that the new conception of Christianity first came into conflict with tradition over indulgences, and the doctrine of penance is a clear proof of the prac-

tical religious nature of the Lutheran Reformation. The following principles became clear to Luther in the course of the Indulgence Controversy, and really lay at the foundation of the Theses:—The true interior contrition demanded in *Matt.* 4: 17, can only proceed from the consideration of the divine goodness and love; for the natural man possesses free will only to evil; “and so long as he acts of himself he sins mortally.” Such true penitence cannot proceed from the law;—“The law worketh the wrath of God, it kills, it accuses, pronounces guilty, it judges, it condemns whatever is not in Christ.” It is true that the law works a kind of contrition [attrition]; but in itself alone this leads to hypocrisy. The remembrance of the law and the remembrance of sins, is therefore injurious before one believes. True contrition must be begun by the kindness and mercies of Christ, that one may come, first to learn his own ingratitude by the vision of the divine goodness, and from this to a hatred of himself and a love of the kindness of God.” To him, however, who knows Christ’s cross, consideration of the law and despair of himself are wholesome. “Mortification” and “Vivification” go side by side in the Christian life. The Christian accepts as a cross the “being destroyed by the law.” The passive and the active contrition therefore come together here. The one great matter with Luther is “to live in bare faith in the compassion of God.” “*Summa summarum*—to him who believes everything is advantageous, nothing is injurious; to him who believes not, everything is injurious, nothing is advantageous. There is no greater sin than not to believe the article on the forgiveness of sins.” From this comes the necessary conclusion as to the difference between the Lutheran and Catholic view, viz: the conviction that *true faith and assurance of salvation are inseparable.*

3.) The *sacrament* of penance falls into the background in view of this conception of *penance*. Penances are not enjoined in Scripture. God gives freely. The best penance is “to sin no more.” The main thing in the sacrament of penance is the priestly absolution which is *to be believed* as God’s promised word;—“The sacrament cleanses not because it is performed, but *because it is believed.*” The sacraments are nothing more than special forms of the offer of the gospel, and “it is better to omit the sacrament than not to proclaim the gospel.”

4.) The new application of the forgiveness of sins, and the faith which grasps it, became necessarily of critical significance to *Christology*. It is the one thing of importance “to live in the

bare faith in God's compassion." For this end the *historical* Christ includes the *whole* knowledge of God. Augustine's central point "of the *Word* who was in the beginning with God," was swallowed up in another which moved about the "humility" of the Incarnate One. The development introduced by Anselm and Bernard found here its conclusion,—“God is to be known *only* in Christ, and to know Christ is to accept grace from Him.” In a sermon on Ascension Day, early in 1517, Luther showed that this new knowledge was connected with the thoughts of Augustine and Bernard on the *humility* of Christ as the way to God. He declares,—“Turn thine eyes away from the majesty of God, and turn them toward his humanity lying on his mother's bosom.” Faith in God's compassion was the whole of subjective Christianity. In the Heidelberg Theses (19, 20, 22) he says,—“It is of no value to any one to recognize God in his glory and majesty except one recognizes the same in the ignominy of the cross. . . . Thus in *John* 14, when Philip, in accordance with the theology of glory, said ‘Show us the Father,’ with difficulty Christ calls him back and brings his volatile thought of seeking God, back to Himself by saying, ‘He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.’ Therefore in Christ crucified is true theology—the theology of the cross and the knowledge of God.” In Luther's *Sermons on Exodus*, in 1525, he said,—“That He is by nature man and God—that He has for Himself; but that He has so exercised His office and sent out His love and become my Savior and Redeemer, that is my comfort and blessing. It concerns me that He will save His people from their sins.” Yet Luther had no thought of any mere humanitarian christology. He recognized the still more perfect knowledge of God, and the knowledge of Christ “according to His divinity. From the view of this springs all rest in this life and forever.”

5.) Luther, even at the beginning of 1519, felt himself to be a Roman Catholic Christian. After meeting Miltitz, in February, 1519, he could speak like a good Catholic of the intercession of the dear saints, of purgatory, of the commandments of the Holy Church. But in June, 1519, before the Leipzig disputation, he maintained openly in the defense of the Thirteen Propositions,—“I declare that I know not whether Christian faith can allow that there be on earth another Head of the Church Universal besides Christ. . . . The church is called the kingdom of faith because our king is not seen, but is believed in; . . . but these make a kingdom of things present in that they erect a visible head.” From the Spring of

1519 his view of the church is plain in all its definiteness,—“The keys are intrusted to no private individual, but to the church alone, because . . . we are not certain whether we have a revelation of the Father or not. But the church is that of which we may not doubt, for here the symbol stands more firm—‘I believe in the Holy Church, the communion of Saints, etc.’ not as some now dream,—‘I believe the Holy Church to be the prelates’, . . . The whole earth confesses that it believes the Holy Catholic Church to be nothing else than the Communion of Saints.” “It is certain that the priest does not use the keys by his own right, but in the service of the church, i. e , because he is the servant of the church.”

6.) The Leipzig Disputation of July, 1516, established these thoughts for Luther, together with what followed it. In a letter of October 3, 1519, he said,—‘I have this hour received from Prague, in Bohemia, letters on two points of that sect concerning both kinds [bread and wine], together with a little book of John Hus [*De ecclesia*]’ It showed Luther that in the case of Hus the Roman Catholic church had already condemned the true view of the church. In February, 1520, Luther declared,—“We are all ignorant Hussites.” “I am so driven that I scarcely doubt that the pope is anti-Christ.” The critical application of his fundamental ideas reached still further as is proved by the sermons in the fall of 1519 on the Sacrament of Penance, the Sacrament of Baptism, and the Sacrament of the Holy Body of Christ. Compare these with a letter to Saplatin in December, 1519,—“There is no further sacrament. . . . A sacrament does not exist except where there is a distinct divine promise given which calls for *faith*, since without the word of one promising and the faith of the one receiving there is for us no business possible with God.” In the spring of 1520, in a sermon on Good Works, he set forth the ideal of *Christian piety* as it appeared in his clarified knowledge:—“The first and highest of all noble good work is to believe in Christ,—the work of the First Commandment; for that means to love one God, to trust him heartily, and ascribe to him all good, grace and well-being, whether in work or in suffering, in living or in dying.” “Even the most insignificant duties of our calling are good works.” “All works which are not commanded are dangerous.” “In the commanded works the believer is free, because he needs no law; in those not commanded, he is free because he may do them or leave them undone, according as the well-being of himself and his neighbor demands.” In his treatise on the Pope of Rome, June, 1520, against

the celebrated Romanist, Alveld, in Leipzig, he even ventured to give to the *laity* his ideas of the church;—"Christendom means a gathering of all believers in Christ [*Eph.* 4:5]. That means properly a spiritual unity,—which is enough alone to make a Christendom. The signs which one may see outwardly where the one church is in the world, are baptism, the sacrament and the gospel; and *not* Rome,—this or that place. And where baptism and the gospel are shall no man doubt that there it is holy, though there be but a mere child in a cradle."

7.) From the summer of 1520 Luther's conceptions of Christianity in their positive aspect were practically complete. In his *Address to the Christian Nobles* his vigorous use of the universal priesthood, and praise of the duties of the worldly calling, are especially important for the history of doctrine. Also his polemic against the authority and infallibility of the pope, the anti-Christ, and his taking up the cause of the Bohemians. In the *Babylonian Captivity* he attacked the doctrine of the sacraments in accordance with the ideas already set forth. The *promise* of all the sacraments is the forgiveness of sins. Therefore the call for faith, "for they are not fulfilled in that they are performed but in that they are believed," The sign or "sacrament" of the Lord's Supper is Christ's body delivered up to death, and his blood, in the unchanged bread and wine." This replacing of transubstantiation by consubstantiation, Luther confesses to have derived from the nominalistic-scholastic tradition in D'Ailly,—and D'Ailly thought substantially like Occam. "We must adhere simply to Christ's words, being prepared to be ignorant of whatever there takes place, and being content that the true body of Christ is there present by virtue of His words." He also says plainly that he who will may retain the transubstantiation doctrine. In the treatise *On Christian Liberty* Luther sets forth his positive fundamental principles without polemic. (1). A christian man is a most free lord of all things and subject to none. (2). A christian man is the most obliging servant of all subject to every one. Luther in this treatise, made clearer by the letter to Leo X which precedes it, reduced practical christianity to the doctrine of salvation in the *religious* sense. Back of sin in the ethical sense is sin in the religious sense,—*unbelief*. Luther did what Augustine sought in vain to do, to give back to christianity its religious character.

3. *Old Catholic Presuppositions and Dogmas retained by Luther;*

1). Of the three-fold foundation of the church,—The Rule of



Faith, The Verbally Inspired Canon, and the Constitution by Bishops—Luther set aside only the third, while the other two still had weight with him though weakened. In the doctrine of the sacrament the influence of middle age development was not wholly overcome. Some of Luther's new ideas although purely religious in conception were not given expression without disturbing influences from metaphysical traditions.

Although for Luther the church was not a *Lehrkirche* but a *religious congregation* every one of whom is a member of the church who possesses justifying, saving faith, yet he held fast to the conception that in the church there must be a *public doctrine*, the recognition of which conditioned membership in the church. He did this without being conscious that this conception was not compatible with the former. In 1518 he said,—“A heretic is one who does not believe what it is necessary and what we are commanded to believe.” And in 1530 he also said,—“He is a heretic who errs stubbornly as to an article of faith and so confesses.” It is evident that Luther recognized that there are errors in doctrine which do not shut out from the church or from salvation, as Augustine said of himself,—“I may err but I shall not be a heretic.” This could not be said of unbelievers in the religious sense where the heretic is thought of “as laying another foundation.” He held fast to the conception “that from the Scriptures *doctrine* must be derived which must have authority in the church,” without reconciling this with the faith conception of the church. And just because he thought of this doctrine as essential to salvation he emphasized doctrine above life in a way which must advance doctrinism, especially if a religious conception should be wanting. In 1531 we find him saying,—“To be perfect is first that the doctrine be right and perfect, and that the life be guided thereby.” Compare this with a sermon on Genesis in 1523,—“The doctrine is that I believe on Christ and count my work, sufferings and death as nothing. . . There is less depending on the work than on the doctrine; since even if the life be not so pure yet the doctrine may remain pure and we may be patient with the life.”

2). From 1518 and 1519 he sets forth with increasing clearness that “all articles of faith are sufficiently set forth in the Scriptures; that no one may add more.” And the more he rejected the “commandments of men,” and fanaticism, the more he emphasized the sole authority of the word of God or the Scriptures. By 1525 this *appeal to Scriptures* can be recognized as the formal

principle of the Reformation, along side of the essential principle of justification. In reality this formal principle was closely connected with his new central ideas, and had concealed in itself the germ of a new purely religious view of the word of God. For to Luther the word of God is primarily the Gospel, pronounced both orally and in writing,—“Thou askest ‘What is this word . . . since there are so many words of God’? I answer ‘Paul, in Romans I, makes it plain, viz. the gospel concerning the incarnate, suffering, rising, Son of God.’” But Luther takes it for granted that the “Holy Scriptures” and “Word of God” are interchangeable. And this view was never attacked in this period. In *Table Talk* he says,—“He who grants that the writings of the Evangelists are God’s word, with him will I discuss. But who denies this with him will I have not a word; for we should not discuss with one who denies the first principles.” Even if this *fides historica*, in distinction from the word of God, could be recognized as one of the good works following faith and not conditioning it, yet the interchangeableness of the “Word of God” and “Holy Scriptures” is a remnant of the old Catholic views which was not in accord with Luther’s fundamental ideas. And it became fateful in the reduction of Christian doctrine to a “fundamental conception necessary to salvation,” the more vigorously Luther and his adherents rejected on principle the allegorical exegesis.

3). Luther made no critical application of his fundamental ideas to the old churchly dogmatic formulas contained in the three symbols. He always prized especially the Apostles’ Creed. He read unto it his *religious* conceptions; and to him the Athanasian as well as the Nicene is only a defensive symbol for the Apostles’ Creed. But it is still true that if Luther had expounded the Apostles’ Creed for the *learned*, he would have interpreted into it without hesitation all the formulas of the Athanasian Creed. Thus he and his colleagues actually—although at first with religious significance—accepted the *lex fidei* of the old church, which rightly understood says nothing at all practically of the re-discovered *religious* faith, and as a *law* of faith of course practically denies it.

4). As to the *Sacraments* Luther himself completely changed the middle age conceptions and brought them into harmony with his fundamental ideas. He had done this by regarding the *word of promise* as that which really mediates grace—i. e. forgiveness of sins, and thus by thinking of the actual bestowment of grace in the sacraments as dependent upon faith. But a dependence upon mid-

dle age *forms* was dangerous and fateful. In reference to infant baptism, for example, Luther did not think out to the end the new ideas which here changed the *opus operatum* idea. At first he supplemented his original opinion,—that in baptism a *faith not its own* entered in for the salvation of the child; and then substituted for it that in baptism faith was *given* to the child. Now since according to Luther baptism is “not a momentary affair but a perpetual one,” in so far as it lays the foundation of the relation in which we may and ought to remain our life long; and since it is the Spirit’s first work for us, “to bring us into His holy congregation and into the hope of the church that thereby He may preach to us and bring us to Christ;” and since for Luther the new birth is primarily “being received into grace,” his conception of infant baptism would have become the clearest exercise of prevenient grace for the individual, if he had not thought of this “gift of grace” as taking place *in the act of baptism*. This idea, especially in connection with a change in the conception of regeneration, opened the way for the *opus operatum* idea, and was otherwise of deleterious influence on the history of the conception of justification.

5). From a period not later than 1520 Luther’s *predestination ideas* took on a deterministic form in consequence of mediated Thomistic influence, yet how, is still in the dark,—“God does not will the death of the sinner, i. e. in His word, but He wills it in His inscrutable will. But now we must observe the *word*, and leave that inscrutable will This is the highest grade of faith, to believe Him to be merciful who saves so few and condemns so many, to believe Him to be just who of His own will makes us worthy of condemnation.”—The older Lutheran Protestantism was stringently predestinarian. Luther never gave up this view. As late as 1537 he wrote to Capito,—“I know of no book of mine that is just except perhaps *De servo arbitrio*, and the *Catechism*.” In the only place where he later speaks at length on the matter, *On Genesis* in 1542, he points more decidedly away from the concealed God [*Deus absconditus*],—“We look at the revealed God, as we sing in the Psalm. His name is Jesus Christ . . . Jesus Christ is the Lord of Sabaoth nor is there any other God.” Melancthon went other ways. The history of Luther’s predestination ideas is closely bound together with the whole dogmatic development of Lutheranism.

II. The Evangelical Christianity of Zwingli (†1531.)

(Read *Fisher Hist. Ref.* 143-153; *Hist. Doct.* 285 ff; *Dorner* 282-337, *Ritschl* 146-167.)



1). Protestant ideas found a shelter not only in Wittenberg but in Zurich. Out of the soil of the Allied Cantons scarcely connected with the German empire, sprang a reform movement from other roots; and this was able to maintain its independence in spite of a decided influence exerted upon it from Germany. Zwingli gave Luther generous recognition but denied that he became a reformer through his influence,—“I began to preach the gospel of Christ in 1516, before any one in our vicinity knew anything of Luther’s name.” But Loofs thinks Zwingli made a mistake in this matter similar to that of Erasmus who wrote on August 31, 1523,—“I seem to myself to have taught almost all that which Luther teaches.” Zwingli said that he himself read little of Luther,—“We have read almost nothing of Luther’s, and so far as we see up to the present we do not think that he errs in Evangelical doctrine.” Yet from 1518 he had followed the works of Luther; and the number of Luther’s works known to him before 1522 is so large that Zwingli can be thought of as knowing the whole of Luther’s fundamental principles *before his own reformative work began*. Luther’s break for freedom made Zwingli’s easier. Without Zwingli’s being conscious of it Luther’s influence religiously deepened Zwingli’s humanistic enlightenment.

2.) As a *religious* reformer Zwingli was dependent upon Luther, but not as a theologian. He was only rarely able to bring such a religious prepossession as to be able to reproduce Luther’s fundamental principles with Luther’s own clearness; and in his systematic writings the humanistic-philosophic foundation of his conception of Christianity comes continually more and more into view. Even in the first two phases of Zwingli’s reformative development,—up to and including the *Exposition*, and the *Commentary* in 1525,—there is a peculiar coloring. Faith is not as by Luther so exclusively “confidence in *sin-forgiving* grace,” or in Christ’s merit. It is often a mere general “trusting in God alone and believing His words without wavering.” Although Zwingli shares Luther’s view of justification by faith, yet it can readily be seen that he does not put *justificatio* as the forgiveness of sins, in any such central position as is done by Luther. While “becoming righteous” is indeed “nothing else than the putting of one’s self into the grace of God,—and that is true faith;” and faith stands in direct contradistinction from *merit*, yet his wider conception of faith does not permit the clearness of Luther’s ideas here; and it makes possible a stronger emphasis of the ethical significance of faith even

in connection with the ideas of justification.

3.) The root of the differences between Zwingli and Luther is that Luther's expressions concerning faith, gospel, law, justification, which grew out of his own *religious experience*, presuppose the strong conviction of the complete depravity of the natural man. Only and first in the forgiveness of sins, only in Christ as the *Savior*, not in His teachings, does God appear as the source of all good. With Zwingli however the judgment of sin is uncertain. By the side of expressions similar to those of Luther—"Where there is ignorance of God there is nothing but flesh, sin,"—We find also the old churchly and humanistic idea that the Spirit of God works truth also outside the sphere of revelation,—Plato, Cato, Seneca and others, appear to be divine instruments. Indeed Seneca passes as a *sanctissimus vir* full of faith. Hercules, Theseus, Socrates and other heathen are saved. It is true that Zwingli calls Christ "the certainty and pledge of God's grace;" and he is not apparently independent of Luther also in his expressions of God as the Good. Yet his doctrine of God in the *Commentary* has a philosophic coloring to be explained especially from the direct and indirect influence of Augustine and Aquinas. It also follows that the trinitarian dogma is less prominent than the unitarianism of philosophic monotheism; yet it is accepted together with the Nicene and Athanasian Symbols, and set forth in its proper place; while we find in Zwingli no parallels for Luther's religious use of these old dogmas and his giving them a new significance.

4). In the latter part of 1523 Zwingli became certain of his deviation from Luther on the Sacrament, when he learned that Luther had treated with strong disfavor the letter sent by him to the Netherlander Honius. Honius made the *est* at the establishment of the Sacrament mean *significat*, and appealed to the analogy in *Matt.* 11:14. *John* 19:26, *I Cor.* 10:4. etc. Zwingli came to see that in this word "a metaphor was hidden." His completely developed symbolic conception of the Lord's Supper Zwingli set forth in a letter to Alber, November 16, 1525, and published in the *Commentary* in the spring of 1525;—"The flesh profiteth nothing. Let this be here a brazen wall . . . Not by being eaten [*csus*] but by being slain [*caesus*] is Christ our salvation. His body is eaten then where it is believed in as slain . . . In the Scripture *est* in more than one place is used for *significat* [*Gen.* 41:26, *Luke* 8;11, *Matt.* 13:19, etc.] Thus it must be seen that all things agree if we only take *est* in the sense of *significat*. What then does that eating accomplish?

Nothing else except that it makes *thee* plain to thy brother as a member of Christ and of them who believe in Christ, and again it binds thee to a Christian life."

5). The controversy with the Anabaptists had important consequences also for the *theological* development of Zwingli's ideas. In order to reduce *ad absurdum* the Anabaptist assertion that "only those who actually believe are to be baptized," Zwingli in 1527 emphasized the statement that *before* faith as a ground of salvation stands the divine "calling, determination and election." "Faith has scarcely the fourth place. He who has faith has the most certain sign of his eternal salvation, but not the original cause of his salvation. Those who are elect are sons of God before they believe." Thus the practical interests of this controversy pushed election into the foreground. And as election was closely connected with the philosophic elements of Zwingli's conception of God, and as Zwingli's predisposition to systematize could here become active, it made it likely in Switzerland also that the reformation ideas would be made over into a dogmatic system. *The idea of Providence is the center of Zwingli's whole system.* This idea also influenced Zwingli's conception of *individual doctrines*. He no longer hesitated to draw the conclusion that God was the cause of evil, so that his predestination doctrine became supra-lapsarian. It is of importance that because of the emphasis placed on election, and because of the influence at the same time from the new conception of the sacrament Zwingli's views of original sin and of the church were also changed. As to his conception of the church in *Fidei ratio* and *Fidei exposito* Zwingli was influenced by the same reasons to place the *church of the elect* made up of all true believers, so in contrast to the universal visible church with its local divisions, that external preaching and the administration of the sacraments no longer seemed to be related to the *true* church. According to Zwingli heathen also might belong to the elect.

III. The Doctrinal Conception of Evangelical Christianity by Calvin. (†1564).

(Read *Fisher Hist. Ref.* 219-241, *Hist. Doct.* 298-309. *Dorner*, 384-414. *Schaff Ch. Hist.* VII, 538-593. *Creeds, Etc.*, 446-471. *Ritschl*, 184-195.)

1). John Calvin not only influenced the symbolical conclusion of the doctrinal development of the 16th Century in the "Reformed" circles, but also the development of Lutheranism which led to the Formula of Concord. Although because of his political activity he



must himself be called a reformer, yet as a theologian he is a "son of the Reformation." A revised church doctrine was already in existence when, by his conversion, he was suddenly won for Protestantism. In the first edition of his *Institutes*,—*Introduction to the Christian Religion*, he appears, as Loofs thinks, like a high German Lutheran. Passing over minor details Calvin differed from Luther principally in his doctrine of the Lord's Supper and in his Christology, in so far as the latter is at all connected with the former. Calvin agreed with Zwingli in the symbolic understanding of the *hoc est*; also in that there is "a perpetual condition of body, and it is confined to one place"; and in exalting the social nature of the Supper;—"We bind ourselves one to another, to all the offices of love." In other respects, however, Calvin's thoughts on this subject go a different way;—"We say truly that the body of Christ is effectually set forth, but *not naturally*. By which we mean that not only the very substance of the body or that the true and natural body of Christ is there present, but (instead) all the things which Christ in His body offered us as benefits. This is the presence of the body which the reason of the sacrament demands. And this we assert is present here in such efficiency, that it not only offers to our souls the indubitable confidence of eternal life, but even makes us secure concerning the immortality of our flesh. . . . Thus when we behold the bread set forth for a sign of Christ's body this similitude must always be grasped;—as bread nourishes the life of our body, so the body of Christ is the food of our spiritual life." Thus according to Calvin the *Communicatio idiomatum* does not lead to an actual imparting of divine properties to human nature. Christ is everywhere present only virtually,—*potentia et virtute*. Compare this thought with the following,—"He is said to have descended, according to his divinity, not because the divinity left heaven that it might busy itself in the prison of the body, but because, although it filled all things, it yet dwelt corporeally, i. e., naturally in the very humanity of Christ." A not unimportant deviation of Calvin from Luther is seen in the fact that Calvin does not emphasize the close connection between *receiving the remission of sins*, and *sanctification*; and in the fact that Luther's suggestions looking to a thorough critical application of the reformatory ideas fail of parallel in Calvin as in Zwingli. In both respects we see the "Epigone."

2). The later editions of the *Institutes* were mainly directed toward a more systematic *arrangement* of the material and more thorough theological (and anti-heretical) treatment. As to *theol-*



ogy the Second Strassburg Edition of 1539 marks the limit of development. We find here, therefore, no such changes as in the *Loci* of Melanchthon.

3). Loofs speaks of Calvin's use of Scripture as "*authority*," as a "law-book" and rule of Christian faith and life;" and of the "*legal coloring*" of Calvin's conception of Christian life and church constitution connected with the reverence for Scripture; and of Calvin's "*legal grounding of Christian faith and belief.*" That the student may be able to judge intelligently as to whether Calvin's trend is legal and toward authority, or whether it is rather *personal and religious*, this chapter will be concluded by a series of extracts from which a study can be made of some of Calvin's more important conceptions as found in the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, in the sixth American edition translated from the edition of 1559.

1. *Calvin's conception of the knowledge of God and the nature of true religion:—*1). His beginning here is certainly not abstract and metaphysical but concrete and personal:—"True and substantial wisdom principally consists of two parts, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves. But while these two branches of knowledge are so intimately connected, which of them precedes and produces the other is not easy to discover. For, in the first place no man can take a survey of himself but he must immediately turn to the contemplation of God in whom he 'lives and moves,' (I, I, I)." And by this "knowlegde of God" Calvin declares that he does not mean "merely a notion that there is such a Being, but also an acquaintance with whatever we ought to know concerning Him conducing to His glory and our benefit. For we cannot with propriety say there is any knowledge of God where there is no religion or piety . . . No man in the present ruined state of human nature will ever perceive God to be a Father, or the Author of salvation or in any respect propitious, but as pacified by the mediation of Christ; yet it is one thing to understand that God our Maker supports us by His power, governs us by His providence, nourishes us by His goodness, and follows us with blessings of every kind, and it is another thing to embrace the grace of reconciliation proposed to us in Christ . . . By piety I mean a reverence and love of God arising from a knowledge of his benefits. For till men are sensible that they owe everything to God, that they are supported by His paternal care, that He is the author of all the blessings they enjoy, and that nothing should be sought independ-

ently of Him, they will never voluntarily submit to his authority; they will never truly and cordially devote themselves to His service unless they rely upon him alone for true felicity, (I, 2, 1)."

2). But Calvin's concluding observations in this chapter are even more distinctly and decisely *religious*. Indeed it is not easy to see how they could be more so;—"Cold and frivolous," he declares, "are the speculations of those who employ themselves in disquisitions on the essence of God when it would be more interesting to us to become acquainted with His character, and to know what is agreeable to His nature Nor can you have a clear view of Him without discovering Him to be the fountain and origin of all good. This would produce a desire of union to Him, and confidence in Him, if the human mind were not seduced by its own depravity from the right path of investigation . . . He who thus knows Him, sensible that all things are subject to His control, confides in him as Guardian and Protector, and unreservedly commits himself to His care. Persuaded of His goodness and mercy he relies on him with unlimited confidence, nor doubts of finding in His clemency a remedy for all his evils. Knowing Him to be his Lord and Father, he concludes that he ought to mark His government in all things, revere His majesty, endeavor to promote his glory, and obey His commands . . . He restrains himself from sin not merely from a dread of vengeance, but because he loves and reveres God as his Father, honors and worships Him as his Lord, and even though there were no hell, would shudder at the thought of offending Him. See then the nature of pure and genuine religion, (I. 2. 2.)."

2. Calvin's conception of *Scripture as an added light to lead us to the right knowledge of God*—1). Calvin also here drops naturally into the personal conceptions;—"Though the light which presents itself to all eyes both in heaven and in earth is more than sufficient to deprive the ingratitude of men of every excuse, since God sets before them all, without exception, an exhibition of His majesty delineated in the creatures, yet we need another and better assistance properly to direct us to the Creator of the world. Therefore he hath not unnecessarily added the light of His word to make Himself known unto salvation, and hath honored with this privilege those whom He intended to unite in a more close and familiar connection with Himself, (I, 6, 1)." This further quotation carries out the idea of the Scripture not as authority but as divine means;—"Since it is evident therefore that God, foreseeing the inefficacy of his manifestation of Himself in the exquisite

structure of the world, hath afforded the assistance of his word, . . . if we seriously aspire to a sincere contemplation of God, it is necessary for us to pursue this right way. We must come I say to the word, which contains a just and lively description of God as He appears in His works, when those works are estimated not according to our depraved judgment but by the rule of eternal truth, (I, 6, 4).” “But since we are not favored with daily oracles from heaven, and since it is only in the Scriptures that the Lord hath been pleased to preserve His truth in perpetual remembrance, it obtains the same complete credit and authority with believers, when they are satisfied of its divine origin, as if they heard the very words pronounced by God Himself, (I, 7, 1).”

2). Calvin does not have reference to any mere intellectual assent to the Scriptures, for he says, “Though anyone vindicates the sacred word of God from the aspersions of men yet this will not fix in their hearts that assurance which is essential to true piety. Religion appearing to profane men to consist wholly in opinion, in order that they may not believe anything on foolish or slight grounds, they wish and expect it to be proved by rational arguments that Moses and the prophets spoke by divine inspiration. But I reply that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to all reason, (I, 7, 4).”

3). Calvin makes the Scriptures ultimate, not apparently in the interest of external legalism, but in opposition to subjectivism. He does not allow the Scriptures to be superseded by the Spirit;—“There have lately arisen some unsteady men who haughtily pretending to be taught by the Spirit, reject all reading themselves and deride the simplicity of those who still attend to what they style the dead and killing letter. But I would ask them what Spirit that is, by whose inspiration they are elevated to such a sublimity as to dare to despise the doctrine of the Scripture as puerile and mean. For if they answer that it is the Spirit of Christ, how ridiculous is such an assertion! For that the apostles of Christ and other believers in the primitive church were illuminated by no other Spirit, I think they will concede. But not one of them learned from His teaching to condemn the Divine word; they were rather filled with higher reverence for it, as their writings abundantly testify . . . The office of the Spirit, then, which is promised to us, is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine which would seduce us from the re-

ceived doctrine of the Gospel, but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers, (I, 9, 1)."

3. After a wonderful chapter on the splendors of the universe of God [I, 14, 21], and the way this should influence us, Calvin turns to the doctrinal consideration of *trust* which he seeks to emphasize and make important;—"There remains the other point, which approaches more nearly to faith; that while we observe how God has appointed all things for our benefit and safety, and at the same time perceive His power and grace in ourselves, and the great benefits which He has conferred on us, we may thence excite ourselves to confide in Him, to invoke Him, to praise Him, and to love Him. Now, as I have just before suggested, God Himself has demonstrated by the very order of Creation, that He made all things for the sake of man . . . But in this He has been pleased to display His providence and personal solicitude towards us, since before He would make man He prepared everything which He foresaw would be useful or beneficial to him. How great would be, now, the *in-gratitude* to doubt whether we are regarded by this best of fathers, whom we perceive to have been solicitous on our account before we existed! How impious would it be to tremble with diffidence, lest at any time His benignity should desert us in our necessities, which we see was displayed in the greatest affluence of all blessings provided for us while we were yet unborn, (I, 14, 22)."

4. *The sense in which we are corrupt, and in which this knowledge will not prove injurious*;—"We say, that man is corrupted by natural depravity, but which did not originate from nature. We deny that it proceeded from nature, to signify that it is rather an adventitious quality or accident than a substantial property originally innate. Yet we call it natural, that no one may suppose it to be contracted by every individual from corrupt habit, whereas it prevails over all by hereditary right, (II, 1, 11)." This is evidently Augustine's conception of the origin and influence of sin. Calvin does not consider the consciousness of this condition as something to be obliterated;—"I am obliged to repeat here what I premised in the beginning of this chapter—that he who feels the most consternation from a consciousness of his own calamity, poverty, nakedness, and ignominy, has made the greatest proficiency in the knowledge of himself. For there is no danger that man will divest himself of too much, provided he learns that what is wanting in him may be recovered in God, (II, 2, 10)."

5. *Calvin's discussion of sin*, and his affirmation that *our rela-*

tions to sin and grace are always voluntary:—1). “If sin, say they, be necessary, then it ceases to be sin; if it be voluntary, then it may be avoided. These were also the weapons used by Pelagius in his attacks on Augustine . . . I deny that sin is the less criminal because it is necessary; I deny also the other consequence which they infer, that it is avoidable because it is voluntary. For if any one wish to dispute with God and to escape His judgment by the pretext of having been incapable of acting otherwise, he is prepared with an answer, which we have elsewhere advanced, that it rises not from creation but from the corruption of nature that men being enslaved by sin can will nothing but what is evil . . . Bernard also judiciously inculcates the same doctrine, that we are therefore the more miserable because our necessity is voluntarily; which yet constrains us to be so devoted to it that we are, as we have already observed, the slaves of sin, (II, 5, 1).” “In regard to punishments I reply, that they are justly inflicted on us from whom the guilt of sin proceeds. For of what importance is it whether sin be committed with a judgment free or enslaved so it be committed with the voluntary bias of the passions; especially as man is *proved to be a sinner because he is subject to the servitude of sin?* (II, 5, 2).” “But it will be said, what can a miserable sinner do, if the softness of heart which is necessary to obedience be denied him? I ask, what excuse can he plead seeing that he cannot impute the hardness of his heart to anyone but himself? (II, 5, 5).”

2). Calvin argues that *voluntariness* is not eliminated either in saint or sinner;—“We shall easily extricate ourselves from these objections if we properly consider the manner in which the Spirit of the Lord operates in the Saints. The similitude with which they try to cast an odium on our sentiments is quite foreign to the subject; for who is so senseless as to suppose that there is no difference between impelling a man, and throwing a stone? Nor does any such consequence follow from our doctrine. We rank among the natural powers of man, approving, rejecting; willing, nilling; attempting, resisting; that is, a power to approve vanity, and to reject true excellence; to will what is evil, to refuse what is good; to attempt iniquity, and to resist righteousness . . . Shall we then compare a wicked man who is thus subservient to the Divine power, while he only studies to gratify his own corrupt inclination, to a stone which is hurled by an extrinsic impulse, and driven along without any motion, sense, or will of its own? *We* perceive what a vast difference there is. But how does the Lord operate in good

men, to whom the question principally relates? When He erects His kingdom within them, He by His Spirit restrains their will that it may not be hurried away by unsteady and violent passions, according to the propensity of nature; that it may not stagger or fall He establishes and confirms it by the power of His Spirit. For which reason Augustine says 'You will reply to me. Then we are actuated; we do not act. Yes, you both act and are actuated; and you act well when you are actuated by that which is good. The Spirit of God, who actuates you, assists those who act, and calls Himself a helper, because you also perform something.' In the first clause he inculcates that the agency of man is not destroyed by the influence of the Spirit; because the will which is guided to aspire to what is good, belongs to his nature. But the inference which he immediately subjoins from the term *help*, that we perform something, we should not understand in such a sense as though he attributed anything to us independently; but in order to avoid encouraging us in indolence he reconciles the Divine agency with ours in this way; that to will is from nature, to will what is good is from grace. Therefore he had just before said, 'without the assistance of God, we shall be not only unable to conquer, but even to contend,' (II, 5, 14)." Again Calvin says even more clearly, if possible;—"Although whatever good there is in the human will proceeds wholly from the internal influence of the Spirit, yet because we have a natural faculty of willing, we are, not without reason, said to do those things, the praise of which God justly claims to Himself; first, because whatever God does in us becomes ours, by His benignity; secondly, because the understanding is ours, the will is ours, and the effort is ours, which are all directed by Him to that which is good, (II, 5, 15)."

3). Calvin recognizes the supernatural aid as an addition to the natural, without indicating a fundamental difference between them; "The whole human race having perished in the person of Adam, our original excellence and dignity which we have noticed, so far from being advantageous to us only involve us in greater ignominy till God who does not acknowledge the pollution and corruption of man by sin to be His work, appears as a Redeemer in the person of His only begotten Son. Therefore, since we are fallen from life into death, all that knowledge of God as a Creator, of which we have been treating, would be useless unless it were succeeded by faith exhibiting God to us as a Father in Christ. This indeed was the genuine order of nature, that the fabric of the world should be

a school in which we might learn piety, and thence be conducted to eternal life and perfect felicity, (II, 6, 1)."

6. Calvin speaks of the word of God as *the record of the gospel*: and argues that genuine *Christian faith* must be personal, and awakened by *the contemplation of God's disposition of mercy*; and that this faith is to be unhesitating;—1). "This then is the true knowledge of Christ—to receive Him as He is offered by the Father, that is, invested with His gospel; for as He is appointed to be the object of our faith, so we cannot advance in the right way to Him without the guidance of the gospel. The gospel certainly opens up to us those treasures of grace without which Christ would profit us little . . . Comprehending under this term [gospel], the new kind of teaching which Christ, since his appearance as our Master, has given a brighter display of the mercy of the Father, and a more explicit testimony concerning our salvation . . . Wherefore if faith decline in the smallest degree from this object towards which it ought to be directed, it no longer retains its own nature, but becomes an uncertain credulity and erroneous excursion of the mind. The same Divine word is the foundation by which faith is sustained, from which it cannot be moved without an immediate downfall. Take away the word then, and there will be no faith left . . . The word itself, however it may be conveyed to us, is like a mirror in which faith may behold God, Whether therefore God in this instance used the agency of men, or whether he operate solely by his own power, He always discovers Himself by His word to those whom He designs to draw to Himself . . . For the apprehension of faith is not confined to our knowledge that there is a God, but chiefly consists in our understanding what is His disposition towards us. For it is not of so much importance to us to know what He is in Himself, as what He is willing to be of us, (III, 2, 6)."

2). Calvin does not drop this last thought, but takes it up and enforces it. If our confidence of faith is to be sustained we must have ethical knowledge of God's disposition;—"We do not deny that it is the office of faith to subscribe to the truth of God whatever be the time, the nature, or the manner of His communications; but our present inquiry is only what faith finds in the Divine word upon which to rest its dependence and confidence. When our conscience beholds nothing but indignation and vengeance how shall it not tremble and fear? And if God be the object of terror how shall it not fly from Him? But faith ought to seek God, not to fly from Him. It appears then, that we have not yet a complete

definition of faith, since a knowledge of the Divine will indefinitely ought not to be accounted faith. But suppose instead of will—the declaration of which is often productive of fear and sorrow,—we substitute benevolence or mercy. This will certainly bring us nearer to the nature of faith. For we are allured to seek God after we have learned that salvation is laid up for us with Him; which is confirmed to us by His declaring it to be the object of His care and affection. Therefore we need a promise of grace to assure us that He is our propitious Father; since we cannot approach to Him without it, and it is upon this alone that the human heart can securely depend . . . Now we shall have a complete definition of faith if we say that it is a steady and certain knowledge of the Divine benevolence towards us, which being founded on the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, is both revealed to our minds and confirmed to our hearts by the Holy Spirit, (III, 2, 7).”

7. *Calvin's conception of true repentance as permanent and as arising from our knowing that we are of God:—1*). “We intend to signify that a man cannot truly devote himself to repentance unless he knows himself to be of God. Now, no man is truly persuaded that he is of God except he has previously received His grace . . . Such are the effects produced by that spirit of fanaticism [*Anabaptist*] that it terminates repentance within the limits of a few short days which a Christian ought to extend throughout his whole life, (III, 3, 2).”

2). “Concerning repentance, some learned men have said that it consists of two parts—mortification and vivification . . . These terms, provided they be rightly understood are sufficiently adapted to express the nature of repentance; but when they explain vivification of that joy which the mind experiences after its perturbations and fears are allayed, I cannot coincide with them; since it should rather signify an ardent desire and endeavor to live a holy and pious life as though it were said that a man dies to himself that he may begin to live to God, (III, 3, 3).” “And this restoration is not accomplished in a single moment or day or year; but by continued and sometimes even tardy advances the Lord destroys the carnal corruptions of His chosen, purifies them from all pollution, and consecrates them as temples to Himself; renewing all their senses to real purity that they may employ their whole life in the exercise of repentance, and know that this warfare will be terminated only by death, (III, 3, 9).”

8. *Calvin's ideal of the Christian life*,—which is to be holy be-

cause of personal relations with God. Legal relations are absolutely wanting;—1). This Scripture plan of which we are now treating consists chiefly in two things,—the first, that a love of righteousness, to which we have otherwise no natural propensity, be introduced into our hearts; the second, that a rule be prescribed to us to prevent our taking any devious steps in the race of righteousness. Now, in the recommendation of righteousness it uses a great number of very excellent arguments . . . With what better foundation can it begin than when it admonishes us that we ought to be holy *because our God is holy*? . . . When we hear any mention of our union with God we should remember that holiness must be the bond of it; not that we attain communion with Him by the merit of holiness, since it is rather necessary for us, in the first place, to adhere to Him in order that, being endued with His holiness, we may follow whither He calls; but because it is a peculiar property of His glory not to have any intercourse with iniquity and uncleanness, (III, 6, 2)."

2). "And as a further incitement to us it shows that as God the Father has reconciled us to Himself in Christ, so He has exhibited to us in Him a pattern to which it is His will that we should be conformed. Now, let those who are of opinion that the philosophers have the only just and orderly systems of moral philosophy show me in any of their works a more excellent economy than I have stated; but the Scripture deduces its exhortation from the true source when it not only enjoins us to refer our life to God the author of it, to whom it belongs . . . but adds that Christ by whom we have been reconciled to God is proposed to us as an example, whose character we should exhibit in our lives. What can be required more efficacious than this one consideration? Indeed what can be required besides? . . . Unless we addict and devote ourselves to righteousness we do not only most perfidiously revolt from our Creator, but also abjure Him as our Savior . . . It argues that since God has discovered Himself as a Father to us, we must be convinced of the basest ingratitude unless we, on our part, manifest ourselves to be His children . . . That since both our soul and our body are destined to heavenly incorruption and a never-fading crown, we ought to exert our most strenuous efforts to preserve them pure and uncorrupt till the day of the Lord. These I say, are the best foundations for the proper regulation of the life, such as we cannot find in the philosophers, who in the recommendation of virtue never rise above the natural dignity of man, (III, 6, 3)."

3). The charity which Calvin bespeaks for others is also absolutely non-legal in its spirit;—"Yet I would not insist upon it as absolutely necessary that the manners of a Christian should breathe nothing but the perfect gospel,—which nevertheless ought both to be wished and to be aimed at. But I do not so vigorously require evangelical perfection as not to acknowledge as a Christian one who has not yet attained to it; for then all would be excluded from the church. . . . Let us set before our eyes that mark to which alone our pursuit must be directed. Let that be prescribed as the goal towards which we must earnestly tend. For it is not lawful for you to make such a compromise with God as to undertake a part of the duties prescribed to you in His Word, and to omit part of them at your own pleasure. . . . Therefore let us not cease to strive, that we may be incessantly advancing in the way of the Lord . . . till we shall have arrived at a perfection of goodness, which indeed we seek and pursue as long as we live, and shall then attain when, divested of all corporeal infirmity, we shall be admitted by God into complete communion with Him, (III, 6, 5)."

4). Calvin also *religiously* grounds the ethical treatment of self and one's neighbor;—"Show me, if you can, a single individual who, unless he has renounced himself according to the command of the Lord, is voluntarily disposed to practice virtue among men. For all those who have not been influenced by this disposition have followed virtue merely from the love of praise . . . Nor can you find any other remedy than to deny yourself and discard all selfish considerations, and to devote your whole attention to the pursuit of those things which the Lord requires of you, and *which ought to be pursued for this sole reason because they are pleasing to Him*, (III, 7, 2)." "There cannot be imagined a more certain rule or a more powerful exhortation to the observance of it than when we are taught that all the blessings we enjoy are Divine deposits, committed to our trust on this condition, that they should be dispensed for the benefit of our neighbors. . . . Whatever ability a pious man possesses he ought to possess for his brethren, consulting his own private interest in no way inconsistent with a cordial attention to the common edification of the church. Let this then be our rule for benignity and beneficence,—that whatever God has conferred on us which enables us to assist our neighbor, we are the stewards of it and must one day render an account of our stewardship; and that the only right dispensation of what has been committed to us is that which is regulated by the law of love. Thus we shall al-

ways not only connect the study to promote the advantage of others with a concern for our own private interests, but shall prefer the good of others to our own, (III, 7, 6)."

9. *Calvin's Conception of Justification*:—1). He considers justification as the opposite of guilt;—"Leaving all contention about the term, if we attend to the thing itself as it is described to us, every doubt will be removed. For Paul certainly describes justification as an acceptance. . . . He also adduces the definition of it given by David, when he pronounces them to be blessed who receive the free forgiveness of their sins; whence it appears that this righteousness of which he speaks is simply opposed to guilt. But the most decisive passage of all on this point is where he teaches us that the grand object of the ministry of the gospel is, that we may *be reconciled to God*, because He is pleased to receive us into His favor through Christ 'not imputing our trespasses unto us.' . . . We are reputed righteous before God in Him, and out of ourselves, (III, 9, 4)."

2). This justification is absolutely *of grace and by faith*;—"But as many persons imagine righteousness to be composed of faith and works let us also prove before we proceed, that the righteousness of faith is so exceedingly different from that of works, that if one be established the other must necessarily be subverted. . . . In the contrast of legal and evangelical righteousness, which Paul introduces in another place, all works are excluded by what title soever they may be distinguished, (III, 9, 14)." "With respect to the common papists or schoolmen, they are in this matter doubly deceived; both in calling faith a certainty of conscience in expecting from God a reward of merit, and in explaining the grace of God to be, not an imputation of gratuitous righteousness, but the Spirit assisting to the pursuit of holiness, (III, 11, 15)." "It is evident that we obtain justification before God solely by the intervention of the righteousness of Christ, which is equivalent to saying that a man is righteous not in himself, but because the righteousness of Christ is communicated to him by imputation. And this is a point which deserves an attentive consideration. For it supersedes that idle notion that a man is justified by faith because faith receives the spirit of God by whom he is made righteous; which is too repugnant to the foregoing doctrine to be reconcilable to it. For he must certainly be destitute of all righteousness of his own who is taught to seek righteousness out of himself, (III, 11, 23)." "But what means have we of humbling ourselves, ex-

cept by submitting, all poor and destitute, to the Divine mercy? For I do not call it humility, if we suppose that we have anything left, (III, 12, 6).” “Whoever pretend that we are justified by faith because, being regenerated we are righteous by living a spiritual life, they have never tasted the sweetness of grace so as to have confidence that God would be propitious to them. . . . With respect to justification faith is a thing merely passive, bringing nothing of our own to conciliate the favor of God, but receiving what we need from Christ, (III, 13, 5).”

3). This justification, inasmuch as imperfections remain, is always needed;—“It is necessary for us, not to have this blessing for once only, but to retain it as long as we live. Lastly, Paul asserts that the message of a free reconciliation with God is not only promulgated for a day or two, but is perpetual in the church, (III, 14, 11.).”

9. *Calvin's non-legal conception of the relation of the Christian to liberty and to law:*—“Christian liberty, according to my judgment, consists of three parts. The *first* is that the consciences of believers when seeking an assurance of their justification before God, should raise themselves above the law, and forget all righteousness of the law. . . . For the question is, not how we can be righteous, but how, though unrighteous and unworthy, we can be considered as righteous, (III, 19, 2).” The *second* part of Christian liberty, which is dependent on the first, is that their consciences do not observe the law, as being under any legal obligation; but that, being liberated from the yoke of the law, they yield a voluntary obedience to the will of God, (III, 19, 4).” “They who are bound by the yoke of the law are like slaves who have certain daily tasks appointed by their masters. They think they have done nothing and presume not to enter into the presence of their masters without having finished the work prescribed to them. But children, who are treated by their parents in a more liberal manner, hesitate not to present to them their imperfect, and in some respects faulty works, in confidence that their obedience and promptitude of mind will be accepted by them, though they have not performed all that they wished. Such children ought we to be, (III, 15, 5).” “But those who infer that we may commit sin because we are not under the law, may be assured that they have no concern with this liberty, the end of which is to animate us to virtue, (III, 19, 6).” The *third* part of Christian liberty teaches us that we are bound by no obligations before God respecting external

things, which of themselves are indifferent; but that we may indifferently use and at other times omit them. And the knowledge of this liberty also is very necessary for us; for without it we shall have no tranquillity of conscience, nor will there be any end of superstitions. . . . For when the conscience has once fallen into the snare, it enters a long and inextricable labyrinth from which it is afterwards difficult to escape; if a man begin to doubt the lawfulness of using flax in sheets, shirts, handkerchiefs, napkins and table cloths, neither will he be certain respecting hemp, and at last he will doubt the lawfulness of using tow; for he will consider with consider with himself whether he cannot do without handkerchiefs, (III, 19, 7).''

10 *Calvin's conception of prayer, and his exposition of the Lord's Prayer*;—By means of prayer we penetrate to those riches which are reserved with our heavenly Father for our use. . . . Prayer digs out those treasures which the gospel of the Lord discovers to our faith . . . But some will say Does He not without information know both our troubles and our necessities? . . . But such reasoners advert not to the Lord's end in teaching His people to pray; for He has appointed it not so much for His own sake as for ours, (III, 20, 2f).''

''Therefore when we inculcate on believers a certain confidence of mind that God is propitious and benevolent towards them, they consider us as advancing the greatest of all absurdities. But if they were in the habit of true prayer they would certainly understand that there can be no proper invocation of God without such a strong sense of the Divine benevolence . . . For what kind of an address would this be? 'O Lord, I am truly in doubt whether Thou be willing to hear me; but since I am oppressed with anxiety I flee to Thee, that if I be worthy Thou mayest assist me,' . . . That prayer alone is accepted by God which arises (if I may use the expression) from such a presumption of faith, and is founded on an undaunted assurance of hope, (III, 20, 17).'' ''We should all in common call Him 'Our Father' . . . Let a Christian then, regulate his prayers by this rule, that they be common, and comprehend all who are his brethren in Christ; and not only those whom he at present sees and knows to be such, but all men in the world . . . All our prayers ought to be such as to respect that community which our Lord has established in His kingdom and in His family. (III, 20, 38).'' (On the Lord's Prayer see III, 20, 36-48).

11. *Calvin's use of Eternal Election as a means of comfort to believers; and a general discussion of the doctrine*;—1). ''If we need to be recalled to the origin of election to prove that we obtain salvation

from no other source than the mere goodness of God, they who desire to extinguish the principle do all they can to obscure what ought to be loudly celebrated, and to pluck up humility by the roots . . . The discussion of predestination—a subject of itself rather intricate—is made very perplexed and therefore dangerous by human curiosity which no barriers can restrain from wandering into forbidden labyrinths . . . The secrets of His will which He determined to reveal to us He discovers in His word; and these are all that He foresaw would concern us or conduce to our advantage, (III, 21, 1).” “Whatever therefore is declared in the Scripture concerning predestination we must be cautious not to withhold from believers . . . Let us permit the Christian man to open his heart and his ears to all the discourses addressed to him by God, only with this moderation that as soon as the Lord closes his sacred mouth he shall also desist from further inquiry, (III, 21, 3).”

2). For Calvin's statement of the Augustinian doctrine, and the argument from Scripture, see III, 21, 7; III, 22, 1-3.

3). Calvin's appeal to the will of God, not as to an arbitrary power but as the highest rule of justice;—“Foolish mortals enter into many contentions with God as though they could arraign Him to plead to their accusations . . . The will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what He wills must be considered just, for this very reason because *He wills* it. . . Yet we espouse not the notion of the Romish theologians concerning the absolute and arbitrary power of God . . . We represent not God as lawless who is a law to Himself . . . The will of God is not only pure from every fault but the highest standard of perfection, even the law of all laws, (III, 23, 2).” Any apparent arbitrariness is set aside; “For what stronger reason can be alleged than when we are directed to consider *who God is*? How could any any injustice be committed by Him who is the Judge of the world? If it is the peculiar property of the nature of God to do justice then He naturally loves righteousness and hates iniquity, (III, 23, 4).” “Whenever you hear the glory of God mentioned think of His justice. For what deserves praise must be just. Man falls therefore according to the appointment of Divine Providence; but he falls by his own fault. . . Wherefore let us rather contemplate the evident cause of condemnation, which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of mankind, than search after a hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the predestination of God, (III, 23, 8).”

4). “Another argument often urged to overthrow predestina-

tion is that its establishment would destroy all solicitude and exertion for rectitude of conduct. For who can hear, they say, that neither life or death is appointed for him by God's eternal and immutable decree, without immediately concluding that it is of no importance how he conducts himself; since no action of his can in any respect either impede or promote the predestination of God? . . . But Paul declares the end of our election to be, that we may lead a holy and blameless life. If the object of election be holiness of life, it should rather stimulate us to a cheerful practice of it than be used as a pretext for slothfulness. But how inconsistent is it to cease from the practice of virtue because election is sufficient to salvation, while the end proposed in election is our diligent performance of virtuous action! Away then, with such corrupt and sacrilegious perversions of the whole order of election. They carry their blasphemies much further by asserting that anyone who is reprobated by God will labor to no purpose if he endeavor to approve himself to Him by innocence and integrity of life . . . For whence could such exertion originate but from election? . . . Their striving with Him in vain is what can never happen, (III, 23, 12)." No language can be plainer than that with which Calvin concludes the discussion;—"We shall observe the best order if in seeking an assurance of our election we confine our attention to those subsequent signs which are certain attestations of it. Satan never attacks believers with a more grievous or dangerous temptation, than when he disquiets them with doubts of their election, and stimulates to an improper desire of seeking it in a wrong way. I call seeking it in a wrong way when miserable man endeavors to force his way into the secret recesses of Divine wisdom, and to penetrate even to the highest eternity that he may discover what is determined concerning him at the tribunal of God. Then he precipitates himself to be absorbed in the profound of an unfathomable gulf; then he entangles himself in numberless and inextricable snares; then he sinks himself in an abyss of total darkness, (III, 24, 4)."

5). Calvin sees the climax of all in the person of the historical Christ;—"If we seek the fatherly clemency and the propitious heart of God our eyes must be directed to Christ, in whom alone the Father is well pleased. If we seek salvation, life, and the immortality of the heavenly kingdom recourse must be had to no other . . . Now what is the end of election but that, being adopted as children by our heavenly Father, we may by His favor obtain salvation and immortality? Consider and investigate it as much as

you please, you will not find its ultimate scope extend beyond this. The persons therefore whom God has adopted as His children He is said to have chosen not in themselves but in Christ . . . But if we are chosen in Him, we shall find no assurance of our election in ourselves; nor even in God the Father, considered alone, abstractedly from the Son. Christ, therefore is the mirror, in which it behooves us to contemplate our election; and here we may do it with safety, (III, 24, 5)."

(For Calvin's conception of *The Church as the Communion of Saints*, and his judicious *Cautions as to Judging our Brother*, see IV. 1-4, IV, 1, 9-29. For his *Exposition of the Lord's Supper* see IV, 17, 1-9, etc.)

CHAPTER VII.

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT AS SEEN IN THE SYMBOLS OF THE EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT CHURCHES.

The study of the Development of Doctrine in the Western Church may profitably be concluded by an analytical and critical examination of the *Confessions*, *Catechisms* and *Creeds* of the Evangelical Protestant Churches, as found in Schaff's *Creeds of Christendom* Vol. III.





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